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Part I. Infection control issues for 
health care personnel: An overview 
A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This guideline updates and replaces the previ­
ous edition of the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) “Guideline for Infection Control 
in Hospital Personnel,” published in 1983. The 
revised guideline, designed to provide methods 
for reducing the transmission of infections from 
patients to health care personnel and from per­
sonnel to patients, also provides an overview of 
the evidence for recommendations considered 
prudent by consensus of the Hospital Infection 
Control Practices Advisory Committee members. 
A working draft of this guideline was also 
reviewed by experts in infection control, occupa­
tional health, and infectious diseases; however, all 
recommendations contained in the guideline may 
not reflect the opinion of all reviewers. 
This document focuses on the epidemiology of 
and preventive strategies for infections known to 
be transmitted in health care settings and those 
for which there are adequate scientific data on 
which to base recommendations for prevention. 
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The prevention strategies addressed in this docu­
ment include immunizations for vaccine-pre­
ventable diseases, isolation precautions to pre­
vent exposures to infectious agents, management 
of health care personnel exposure to infected per­
sons, including postexposure prophylaxis, and 
work restrictions for exposed or infected health 
care personnel. In addition, because latex barri­
ers are frequently used to protect personnel 
against transmission of infectious agents, this 
guideline addresses issues related to latex hyper­
sensitivity and provides recommendations to pre­
vent sensitization and reactions among health 
care personnel. 
B. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, there are an estimated 8.8 
million persons who work in health care profes­
sions and about 6 million persons work in more 
than 6000 hospitals. However, health care is 
increasingly being provided outside hospitals in 
facilities such as nursing homes, freestanding sur­
gical and outpatient centers, emergency care clin­
ics, and in patients’ homes or during prehospital 
emergency care. Hospital-based personnel and 
personnel who provide health care outside hospi­
tals may acquire infections from or transmit 
infections to patients, other personnel, household 
members, or other community contacts.1,2 
In this document, the term health care person­
nel refers to all paid and unpaid persons work­
ing in health care settings who have the poten­
tial for exposure to infectious materials, includ­
ing body substances, contaminated medical 
supplies and equipment, contaminated environ­
mental surfaces, or contaminated air. These 
personnel may include but are not limited to 
emergency medical service personnel, dental 
personnel, laboratory personnel, autopsy per­
sonnel, nurses, nursing assistants, physicians, 
technicians, therapists, pharmacists, students 
and trainees, contractual staff not employed by 
the health care facility, and persons not directly 
involved in patient care but potentially exposed 
to infectious agents (e.g., clerical, dietary, 
housekeeping, maintenance, and volunteer per­
sonnel). In general, health care personnel in or 
outside hospitals who have contact with 
patients, body fluids, or specimens have a high­
er risk of acquiring or transmitting infections 
than do other health care personnel who have 
only brief casual contact with patients and their 
environment (e.g., beds, furniture, bathrooms, 
food trays, medical equipment). 
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Throughout this document, terms are used to 
describe routes of transmission of infections. 
These terms have been fully described in the 
“Guideline for Isolation Precautions in 
Hospitals.”3 They are summarized as follows: 
direct contact refers to body surface–to–body sur­
face contact and physical transfer of microorgan­
isms between a susceptible host and an infected 
or colonized person (e.g., while performing oral 
care or procedures); indirect contact refers to con­
tact of a susceptible host with a contaminated 
object (e.g., instruments, hands); droplet contact 
refers to conjunctival, nasal, or oral mucosa con­
tact with droplets containing microorganisms 
generated from an infected person (by coughing, 
sneezing, and talking, or during certain proce­
dures such as suctioning and bronchoscopy) that 
are propelled a short distance; airborne transmis­
sion refers to contact with droplet nuclei contain­
ing microorganisms that can remain suspended in 
the air for long periods or to contact with dust 
particles containing an infectious agent that can 
be widely disseminated by air currents; and, final­
ly, common vehicle transmission refers to contact 
with contaminated items such as food, water, 
medications, devices, and equipment. 
In 1983 the CDC published the “Guideline for 
Infection Control in Hospital Personnel.”4 The 
document focused on the prevention of infec­
tions known to be transmitted to and from 
health care personnel. This revision of the guide­
line has been expanded to include (a) recom­
mendations for non–patient care personnel, both 
in and outside hospitals, (b) management of 
exposures, (c) prevention of transmission of 
infections in microbiologic and biomedical labo­
ratories, and, because of the common use of 
latex barriers to prevent infections, (d) preven­
tion of latex hypersensitivity reactions. As in the 
1983 guideline, readers are frequently referred to 
the “Guideline for Isolation Precautions in 
Hospitals”3 and other published guidelines and 
recommendations for precautions that health 
care personnel may use when caring for patients 
or handling patient equipment or specimens.5,6 
C. INFECTION CONTROL OBJECTIVES FOR A 
PERSONNEL HEALTH SERVICE 
The infection control objectives of the person­
nel health service should be an integral part of a 
health care organization’s general program for 
infection control. The objectives usually include 
the following: (a) educating personnel about the 
principles of infection control and stressing indi­
AJIC 
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vidual responsibility for infection control, (b) col­
laborating with the infection control department 
in monitoring and investigating potentially harm­
ful infectious exposures and outbreaks among 
personnel, (c) providing care to personnel for 
work-related illnesses or exposures, (d) identify­
ing work-related infection risks and instituting 
appropriate preventive measures, and (e) contain­
ing costs by preventing infectious diseases that 
result in absenteeism and disability. These objec­
tives cannot be met without the support of the 
health care organization’s administration, med­
ical staff, and other health care personnel. 
Documents that provide more detailed informa­
tion regarding infection control issues for person­
nel health are listed in Appendix A. 
D. ELEMENTS OF A PERSONNEL HEALTH 
SERVICE FOR INFECTION CONTROL 
Certain elements are necessary to attain the 
infection control goals of a personnel health ser­
vice: (a) coordination with other departments, (b) 
medical evaluations, (c) health and safety educa­
tion, (d) immunization programs, (e) manage­
ment of job-related illnesses and exposures to 
infectious diseases, including policies for work 
restrictions for infected or exposed personnel, (f) 
counseling services for personnel on infection 
risks related to employment or special conditions, 
and (g) maintenance and confidentiality of per­
sonnel health records. 
The organization of a personnel health service 
may be influenced by the size of the institution, 
the number of personnel, and the services offered. 
To ensure that contractual personnel who are not 
paid by the health care facility receive appropriate 
personnel health services, contractual agreements 
with their employers should contain provisions 
consistent with the policies of the facility that uses 
those employees. Personnel with specialized 
training and qualifications in occupational health 
can facilitate the provision of effective services. 
1. Coordination with other departments 
For infection control objectives to be achieved, 
the activities of the personnel health service must 
be coordinated with infection control and other 
appropriate departmental personnel. This coordi­
nation will help ensure adequate surveillance of 
infections in personnel and provision of preven­
tive services. Coordinating activities will also help 
to ensure that investigations of exposures and out­
breaks are conducted efficiently and preventive 
measures implemented promptly. 
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2. Medical evaluations 
Medical evaluations before placement can 
ensure that personnel are not placed in jobs that 
would pose undue risk of infection to them, other 
personnel, patients, or visitors. An important com­
ponent of the placement evaluation is a health 
inventory. This usually includes determining 
immunization status and obtaining histories of 
any conditions that might predispose personnel to 
acquiring or transmitting communicable diseases. 
This information will assist in decisions about 
immunizations or postexposure management. 
A physical examination, another component 
of the medical evaluation, can be used to screen 
personnel for conditions that might increase 
the risk of transmitting or acquiring work-relat­
ed diseases and can serve as a baseline for 
determining whether future diseases are work 
related. However, the cost-effectiveness of rou­
tine physical examinations, including laborato­
ry testing (such as complete blood cell counts, 
serologic tests for syphilis, urinalysis, and chest 
radiographs) and screening for enteric or other 
pathogens for infection control purposes, has 
not been demonstrated. Conversely, screening 
for some vaccine-preventable diseases, such as 
hepatitis B, measles, mumps, rubella, or vari­
cella, may be cost-effective. In general, the 
health inventory can be used to guide decisions 
regarding physical examinations or laboratory 
tests. However, some local public health ordi­
nances may mandate that certain screening 
procedures be used. 
Periodic evaluations may be done as indicat­
ed for job reassignment, for ongoing programs 
(e.g., TB screening), or for evaluation of work-
related problems. 
3. Personnel health and safety education 
Personnel are more likely to comply with an 
infection control program if they understand its 
rationale. Thus, personnel education is a cardinal 
element of an effective infection control program. 
Clearly written policies, guidelines, and proce­
dures ensure uniformity, efficiency, and effective 
coordination of activities. However, because the 
risk of infection varies by job category, infection 
control education should be modified accordingly. 
In addition, some personnel may need specialized 
education on infection risks related to their 
employment and on preventive measures that will 
reduce those risks. Furthermore, educational 
materials need to be appropriate in content and 
vocabulary to the educational level, literacy, and 
AJIC 
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Table 1A. Immunobiologics and schedules for health care personnel (modified from ACIP recommendations9): 
Immunizing agents strongly recommended for health care personnel 
Primary booster Major precautions 
Generic name dose schedule Indications and contraindications Special considerations 
Hepatitis B Two doses IM Health care personnel at No apparent adverse No therapeutic or adverse effects on HBV-infect­
recombinant in the deltoid risk of exposure to blood effects to developing ed persons; cost-effectiveness of prevaccination 
vaccine muscle 4 wk and body fluids fetuses, not screening for susceptibility to HBV depends on 
apart; 3rd contraindicated in costs of vaccination and antibody testing and 
dose 5 mo pregnancy; history of prevalence of immunity in the group of potential 
after 2nd; anaphylactic reac­ vaccinees; health care personnel who have 
booster tion to common ongoing contact with patients or blood should 
doses not baker’s yeast be tested 1-2 mo after completing the vaccina­
necessary tion series to determine serologic response 
Influenza Annual single- Health care personnel with History of No evidence of maternal or fetal risk when 
vaccine dose vaccin­ contact with high-risk anaphylactic vaccine was given to pregnant women with 
(inactivated ation IM with patients or working in chron­ hypersensitivity after underlying conditions that render them at 
whole or current ic care facilities; personnel egg ingestion high risk for serious influenza complications. 
split virus) (either whole- with high-risk medical con-
or split-virus) ditions and/or ≥ 65 yr 
vaccine 
Measles live- One dose SC; Health care personnel born in Pregnancy; immuno- MMR is the vaccine of choice if recipients 
virus vaccine 2nd dose at or after 1957 without docu­ compromised* state; are also likely to be susceptible to rubella 
least 1 mo mentation of (a) receipt of (including HIV-infect­ and/or mumps; persons vaccinated 
later two doses of live vaccine on ed persons with between 1963 and 1967 with (a) a killed 
or after their 1st birthday, (b) severe immunosup­ measles vaccine alone, (b) killed vaccine 
physician-diagnosed pression) history of followed by live vaccine, or (c) a vaccine 
measles, or (c) laboratory anaphylactic reac­ of unknown type should be revaccinated 
evidence of immunity; vac­ tions after gelatin with two doses of live measles vaccine 
cine should be considered ingestion or receipt 
for all personnel, including of neomycin; or 
those born before 1957, who recent receipt of 
have no proof of immunity immune globulin 
Mumps live- One dose SC; Health care personnel Pregnancy; immuno- MMR is the vaccine of choice if recipients 
virus vaccine no booster believed to be susceptible compromised* state; are also likely to be susceptible to 
can be vaccinated; adults history of anaphylac­ measles and rubella 
born before 1957 can be tic reaction after 
considered immune gelatin ingestion or 
receipt of neomycin 
Rubella live- One dose SC; Health care personnel, both Pregnancy; immuno- Women pregnant when vaccinated or who 
virus vaccine no booster male and female, who lack compromised* state; become pregnant within 3 mo of vaccina­
documentation of receipt of history of anaphylac­ tion should be counseled on the theoretic 
live vaccine on or after their tic reaction after risks to the fetus, the risk of rubella vac­
1st birthday, or of laboratory receipt of neomycin cine-associated malformations in these 
evidence of immunity; adults women is negligible; MMR is the vaccine 
born before 1957 can be of choice if recipients are also likely to be 
considered immune, except susceptible to measles or mumps 
women of childbearing age 
Varicella- Two 0.5 ml Health care personnel with- Pregnancy, immuno- Because 71%-93% of persons without a his-
zoster live- doses SC, out reliable history of vari­ compromised* state, tory of varicella are immune, serologic test-
virus vac­ 4-8 wk apart cella or laboratory evidence history of anaphylactic ing before vaccination may be cost-effective 
cine if ≥ 13 yr of varicella immunity reaction after receipt 
of neomycin or 
gelatin; salicylate use 
should be avoided for 
6 wk after vaccination 
IM, Intramuscularly; SC, subcutaneously.
 
*Persons immunocompromised because of immune deficiencies, HIV infection, leukemia, lymphoma, generalized malignancy, or immunosuppressive
 
therapy with corticosteroids, alkylating drugs, antimetabolites, or radiation.
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Table 1B. Immunobiologics and schedules for health care personnel (modified from ACIP recommendations9): 
Other immunizing agents available for health care personnel in special circumstances 
Primary/booster Major precautions 





















dose of 0.3 ml; no 
booster dose recom­
mended 
Two doses of vaccine 
IM, either (HAVRIX™ ) 
6-12 mo apart or 
(VAQTA™ ) 6 mo apart 
One dose in volume 
and by route speci­
fied by manufacturer; 
need for boosters is 
unknown 
IPV, two doses SC 
given 4-8 wk apart 
followed by 3rd dose 
6-12 mo after 2nd 
dose; booster doses 
may be IPV or OPV 
Primary, HDCV or RVA, 
IM, 1.0 ml (deltoid area) 
one each on days 0, 7, 
21, or 28, or HDCV, ID, 
1.0 ml, one each on 
days 0, 7, 21, and 28; 
booster, HDCV or RVA, 
IM, 0.1 ml (deltoid area), 
day 0 only, or HDCV, ID, 
0.1 ml, day 0 only 
Two doses IM 4 wk 
apart; 3rd dose 6-12 
mo after 2nd dose; 
booster every 10 yr 
Health care personnel in com­
munities where (a) MDR-TB is 
prevalent, (b) strong likelihood 
of infection exists, and (c) full 
implementation of TB infection 
control precautions has been 
inadequate in controlling the 
spread of infection (NOTE: 
BCG should be used after 
consultation with local and/or 
state health department) 
Not routinely indicated for 
U.S. health care personnel; 
persons who work with 
HAV-infected primates or 
with HAV in a laboratory set­
ting should be vaccinated 
Not routinely indicated for 
health care workers in the 
United States 
Health care personnel in 
close contact with persons 
who may be excreting wild 
virus and laboratory per­
sonnel handling speci­
mens that may contain 
wild poliovirus 
Personnel who work with 
rabies virus or infected 
animals in diagnostic or 
research activities 
All adults; tetanus prophylax­
is in wound management 
Immunocompromised* state 
and pregnancy 
History of anaphylactic reaction to 
alum or the preservative 2-phe­
noxy ethanol; vaccine safety in 
pregnant women has not been 
evaluated, risk to fetus is likely 
low and should be weighed 
against the risk of hepatitis A in 
women at high risk 
Vaccine safety in pregnant 
women has not been evalu­
ated; vaccine should not be 
given during pregnancy 
unless risk of infection is high 
History of anaphylactic reaction 
after receipt of streptomycin 
or neomycin; because safety 
of vaccine has not been eval­
uated in pregnant women, it 
should not be given during 
pregnancy 
First trimester of pregnancy; history 
of a neurologic reaction or imme­
diate hypersensitivity reaction; 
individuals with severe local 
(Arthus-type) reaction after previ­
ous dose of Td vaccine should 
not be given further routine or 
emergency doses of Td for 10 yr 
In the United States, TB con­
trol efforts are directed 
toward early identification 
and treatment of cases of 
active TB and toward pre­
ventive therapy with isoni­
azid for PPD converters 
Health care personnel who 
travel internationally to 
endemic areas should be 
evaluated for vaccination 
May be useful in certain out­
break situations (see text) 
Use only IPV for immunosup­
pressed persons or personnel 
who care for immunosup­
pressed patients; if immediate 
protection against 
poliomyelitis is needed, OPV 
should be used. 
The frequency of booster 
doses should be based on 
frequency of exposure. See 
CDC reference for Rabies 
Prevention for postexposure 
recommendations.22 
Continued 
HDCV, Human diploid cell rabies vaccine; RVA, rabies vaccine absorbed; IPV, inactivated poliovirus vaccine; OPV, oral poliovirus vaccine; ID, intradermally. 
*Persons immunocompromised because of immune deficiencies, HIV infection, leukemia, lymphoma, generalized malignancy, or immunosuppressive ther­
apy with corticosteroids, alkylating drugs, antimetabolites, or radiation. 
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Table 1B. Continued 
Generic name 
Primary/booster 
dose schedule Indications 
Major precautions 
and contraindications Special considerations 
Typhoid vac­
cines: IM, 




One 0.5 ml dose IM; 
booster doses of 0.5 ml 
every 2 yr; (Vi capsular 
polysaccharide) or two 
0.5 ml doses SC, 4 or 
more wk apart; boost­
ers of 0.5 ml SC or 0.1 
ml ID every 3 yr if 
exposure continues or 
four oral doses on alter­
nate days; (Ty21a) vac­
cine manufacturer’s 
recommendation is 
revaccination with the 
entire four-dose series 
every 5 yr 
One dose adminis­
tered with a bifurcat­
ed needle; boosters 
every 10 yr 
Personnel in laboratories 
who frequently work with 
Salmonella typhi 
Personnel who directly han­
dle cultures of or animals 
contaminated with recombi­
nant vaccinia viruses or 
orthopox viruses (monkey­
pox, cowpox, vaccinia, etc.) 
that infect human beings 
History of severe local or sys­
temic reaction to a previous 
dose of typhoid vaccine; 
Ty21a vaccine should not be 
given to immunocompro­
mised* personnel 
Pregnancy, presence or histo­
ry of eczema, or immuno­
compromised* status in 
potential vaccinees or in their 
household contacts 
Vaccination should not be con­
sidered as an alternative to 
the use of proper procedures 
when handling specimens 
and cultures in the laboratory 
Vaccination may be considered 
for health care personnel who 
have direct contact with conta­
minated dressings or other 
infectious material from volun­
teers in clinical studies involv­
ing recombinant vaccinia virus 
language of the employee. The training should 
comply with existing federal, state, and local reg­
ulations regarding requirements for employee 
education and training. All health care personnel 
need to be educated about the organization’s 
infection control policies and procedures. 
4. Immunization programs 
Ensuring that personnel are immune to vac­
cine-preventable diseases is an essential part of 
successful personnel health programs. Optimal 
use of vaccines can prevent transmission of vac­
cine-preventable diseases and eliminate unneces­
sary work restriction. Prevention of illness 
through comprehensive personnel immunization 
programs is far more cost-effective than case 
management and outbreak control. Mandatory 
immunization programs, which include both 
newly hired and currently employed persons, are 
more effective than voluntary programs in ensur­
ing that susceptible persons are vaccinated.7 
National guidelines for immunization of and 
postexposure prophylaxis for health care person­
nel are provided by the U.S. Public Health 
Service’s Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices (ACIP; Table 1).8,9 ACIP guidelines also 
contain (a) detailed information on the epidemi­
ology of vaccine-preventable diseases, (b) data on 
the safety and efficacy of vaccines and immune 
globulin preparations,8-22 and (c) recommenda­
tions for immunization of immunocompromised 
persons* (Table 2).16,23 The recommendations in 
this guideline have been adapted from the ACIP 
recommendations.9 In addition, individual states 
and professional organizations have regulations 
or recommendations on the vaccination of health 
care personnel.24 
Decisions about which vaccines to include in 
immunization programs have been made by con­
sidering (a) the likelihood of personnel exposure to 
vaccine-preventable diseases and the potential con­
sequences of not vaccinating personnel, (b) the 
nature of employment (type of contact with patients 
and their environment), and (c) the characteristics 
of the patient population within the health care 
organization. Immunization of personnel before 
they enter high-risk situations is the most efficient 
and effective use of vaccines in health care settings. 
Screening tests are available to determine sus­
ceptibility to certain vaccine-preventable diseases 
*The term immunocompromised includes persons who are 
immunocompromised from immune deficiency diseases, 
HIV infection, leukemia, lymphoma, or generalized malig­
nancy, or immunosuppressed as a result of therapy with cor­
ticosteroids, alkylating drugs, antimetabolites, or radiation. 
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Table 1C. Immunobiologics and schedules for health care personnel (modified from ACIP recommendations9): 
Diseases for which postexposure prophylaxis may be indicated for health care personnel 
Major precautions and 










Benzathine penicillin, 1.2 
mU IM, single dose, or 
erythromycin (1 
gm/day) PO × 7 days 
One IM dose IG 0.02 ml/kg 
given within 2 wk of 
exposure in large muscle 
mass (deltoid, gluteal) 
HBIG 0.06 ml/kg IM as 
soon as possible (and 
within 7 days) after 
exposure (with dose 1 of 
hepatitis B vaccine given 
at different body site); if 
hepatitis B series has not 
been started, 2nd dose 
of HBIG should be given 
1 mo after 1st 
Rifampin, 600 mg PO 
every 12 hours for 2 
days, or ceftriaxone, 
250 mg IM, single 
dose, or ciprofloxacin, 
500 mg PO, single 
dose 
Erythromycin, 500 mg 
qid PO, or trimetho­
prim-sulfamethoxazole, 
1 tablet bid PO, for 14 
days after exposure 
For those never vacci­
nated: HRIG 20 IU/kg, 
half infiltrated around 
wound, and HDCV or 
RVA vaccine, 1.0 ml, 
IM (deltoid area), 1 
each on days 0, 3, 7, 
14, and 28 
VZIG for persons ≤50 kg: 
125 U/10kg IM; for per­
sons >50 kg: 625 U† 
For health care personnel 
exposed to diphtheria or identi­
fied as carriers 
May be indicated for health care 
personnel exposed to feces of 
infected persons during out­
breaks 
HBV-susceptible health care per­
sonnel with percutaneous or 
mucous-membrane exposure to 
blood known to be HBsAg 
seropositive (see Table 5) 
Personnel with direct contact with 
respiratory secretions from infect­
ed persons without the use of 
proper precautions (e.g., mouth­
to-mouth resuscitation, endotra­
cheal intubation, endotracheal 
tube management, or close 
examination of oropharynx ) 
Personnel with direct contact with 
respiratory secretions or large 
aerosol droplets from respiratory 
tract of infected persons. 
Personnel who have been bitten 
by human being or animal with 
rabies or have had scratches, 
abrasions, open wounds, or 
mucous membranes contami­
nated with saliva or other poten­
tially infective material (e.g., 
brain tissue) 
Personnel known or likely to be 
susceptible to varicella and who 
have close and prolonged expo­
sure to an infectious health care 
worker or patient, particularly 
those at high risk for complica­
tions, such as pregnant or 
immunocompromised persons 
Persons with IgA deficiency; 
do not administer within 2 
wk after MMR or within 3 





Also administer one dose 
Td to previously immu­
nized if no Td has been 
given in ≥ 5 yr 
Personnel who have previ­
ously been vaccinated, 
give HDCV or RVA vac­
cine, 1.0 ml, IM, on days 
0 and 3; no HRIG is nec­
essary 
Serologic testing may help 
in assessing whether to 
administer VZIG; if vari­
cella is prevented by the 
use of VZIG, vaccine 
should be offered later 
PO, Orally; Td, tetanus-diphtheria toxoid; IG, immune globulin; IgA, immunoglobulin A; qid, four times daily; bid, twice daily; HRIG, human rabies
 
immunoglobulin; HDCV, human diploid cell rabies vaccine; RVA, rabies vaccine absorbed.
 
*Persons immunocompromised because of immune deficiencies, HIV infection, leukemia, lymphoma, generalized malignancy, or immunosuppressive
 
therapy with corticosteroids, alkylating drugs, antimetabolites, or radiation.
 
†Some persons have recommended 125 U/10 kg regardless of total body weight. 
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Table 2. Summary of ACIP recommendations on immunization of health care workers with special conditions (modified 
from ACIP recommendations9) 
Severe Alcoholism & 
Vaccine Pregnancy HIV infection immunosuppression* Asplenia Renal failure Diabetes alcoholic cirrhosis 
BCG UI C C UI UI UI UI 
Hepatitis A UI UI UI UI UI UI R† 
Hepatitis B R R R R R R R 
Influenza R‡ R R R R R R 
Measles, mumps, rubella C R§ C R R R R 
Meningococcus UI UI UI R† UI UI UI 
Polio, IPV || UI UI UI UI UI UI UI 
Polio, OPV || UI C C UI UI UI UI 
Pneumococcus† UI R R R R R R 
Rabies UI UI UI UI UI UI UI 
Tetanus/diphtheria† R R R R R R R 
Typhoid, inactivated & Vi UI UI UI UI UI UI UI 
Typhoid, Ty21a UI C C UI UI UI UI 
Varicella C C C R R R R 
Vaccinia UI C C UI UI UI UI 
UI, Use if indicated; C, contraindicated; R, recommended.
 
*Severe immunosuppression can be the result of congenital immunodeficiency, leukemia, lymphoma, generalized malignancy or therapy with alkylating
 
agents, antimetabolites, radiation, or large amounts of corticosteroids.
 
†Recommendation is based on the person’s underlying condition rather than occupation. 
‡Women who will be in the second or third trimester of pregnancy during influenza season. 
§Contraindicated in persons with HIV infection and severe immunosuppression; see text. 
|| Vaccination is recommended for unvaccinated health care workers who have close contact with patients who may be excreting wild polioviruses. Primary 
vaccination with IPV is recommended because the risk for vaccine-associated paralysis after administration of OPV is higher among adults than among chil­
dren. Health care workers who have had a primary series of OPV or IPV who are directly involved with the provision of care to patients who may be excret­
ing poliovirus may receive another dose of either IPV or OPV. Any suspected case of poliomyelitis should be investigated immediately. If evidence suggests 
transmission of wild poliovirus, control measures to contain further transmission should be instituted immediately, including an OPV vaccination campaign. 
(e.g., hepatitis B, measles, mumps, rubella, and 
varicella). Such screening programs need to be 
combined with tracking systems to ensure accu­
rate maintenance of personnel immunization 
records. Accurate immunization records ensure 
that susceptible personnel are promptly identified 
and appropriately vaccinated. 
5. Management of job-related illnesses and 
exposures 
Primary functions of the personnel health ser­
vice are to arrange for prompt diagnosis and man­
agement of job-related illnesses and to provide 
appropriate postexposure prophylaxis after job-
related exposures. 
It is the responsibility of the health care orga­
nization to implement measures to prevent fur­
ther transmission of infection, which some­
times warrants exclusion of personnel from 
work or patient contact.25 Decisions on work 
restrictions are based on the mode of transmis­
sion and the epidemiology of the disease (Table 
3). The term exclude from duty in this document 
should be interpreted as exclusion from the 
health care facility and from health care activi­
ties outside the facility. Personnel who are 
excluded should avoid contact with susceptible 
persons both in the facility and in the commu­
nity. Exclusion policies should include a state­
ment of authority defining who may exclude 
personnel. The policies also need to be designed 
to encourage personnel to report their illnesses 
or exposures and not to penalize them with loss 
of wages, benefits, or job status. Workers’ com­
pensation laws do not cover exclusion from 
duty for exposures to infectious diseases; poli­
cies therefore should include a method for pro­
viding wages during the period that personnel 
are not able to work. In addition, exclusion 
policies must be enforceable and all personnel, 
especially department heads, supervisors, and 
nurse managers, should know which infections 
may warrant exclusion and where to report the 
illnesses 24 hours a day. Health care personnel 
who have contact with infectious patients out­
side of hospitals also need to be included in the 
postexposure program and encouraged to 
report any suspected or known exposures 
promptly. Notification of emergency-response 
personnel possibly exposed to selected infec­
tious disease is mandatory (1990 Ryan White 
Act, Subtitle B, 42 USC 300ff-80). 
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Table 3. Summary of suggested work restrictions for health care personnel exposed to or infected with infectious diseases 
of importance in health care settings, in the absence of state and local regulations (modified from ACIP recommendations9) 




Acute stage (diarrhea 







Personnel with acute or 
chronic hepatitis B sur 
face antigemia who do 
not perform exposure-
prone procedures 
Personnel with acute or 
chronic hepatitis B e anti­










Restrict from patient contact and contact with the 
patient’s environment 
No restriction 
Restrict from patient contact, contact with the 
patient’s environment, or food handling 
Restrict from care of high-risk patients 
Exclude from duty 
Restrict from care of infants, neonates, and immuno­
compromised patients and their environments 
Restrict from patient contact, contact with patient’s 
environment, and food handling 
No restriction*; refer to state regulations; standard 
precautions should always be observed 
Do not perform exposure-prone invasive proce­
dures until counsel from an expert review panel 
has been sought; panel should review and recom­
mend procedures the worker can perform, taking 
into account specific procedure as well as skill 
and technique of worker; refer to state regulations 
No recommendation 
No restriction 
Restrict from patient contact and contact with the 
patient’s environment 
Evaluate for need to restrict from care of high-risk patients 
Do not perform exposure-prone invasive procedures 
until counsel from an expert review panel has been 
sought; panel should review and recommend proce­
dures the worker can perform, taking into account 
specific procedure as well as skill and technique of 
the worker; standard precautions should always be 
observed; refer to state regulations 
Until discharge ceases 
Until symptoms resolve 
Until symptoms resolve; consult with local 
and state health authorities regarding 
need for negative stool cultures 
Until antimicrobial therapy completed 
and 2 cultures obtained ≥ 24 hours 
apart are negative 
Until symptoms resolve 
Until 7 days after onset of jaundice 
Until hepatitis B e antigen is negative 






























*Unless epidemiologically linked to transmission of infection 
†Those susceptible to varicella and who are at increased risk of complications of varicella, such as neonates and immunocompromised persons of any age. 
‡ High-risk patients as defined by the ACIP for complications of influenza. 
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Table 3. Continued 
Disease/problem Work restriction Duration Category 
Measles 
Active Exclude from duty Until 7 days after the rash appears IA 
Postexposure (susceptible Exclude from duty From 5th day after 1st exposure IB 
personnel) through 21st day after last exposure 
and/or 4 days after rash appears 
Meningococcal infections Exclude from duty Until 24 hours after start of effective IA 
therapy 
Mumps 
Active Exclude from duty Until 9 days after onset of parotitis IB 
Postexposure (susceptible Exclude from duty From 12th day after 1st exposure II 
personnel) through 26th day after last exposure 
or until 9 days after onset of parotitis 
Pediculosis Restrict from patient contact Until treated and observed to be free IB 
of adult and immature lice 
Pertussis 
Active Exclude from duty From beginning of catarrhal stage IB 
through 3rd wk after onset of parox­
ysms or until 5 days after start of 
effective antimicrobial therapy 
Postexposure (asympto- No restriction, prophylaxis recommended II 
matic personnel) 
Postexposure (sympto- Exclude from duty Until 5 days after start of effective IB 
matic personnel) antimicrobial therapy 
Rubella 
Active Exclude from duty Until 5 days after rash appears IA 
Postexposure (suscepti- Exclude from duty From 7th day after 1st exposure IB 
ble personnel) through 21st day after last exposure 
Scabies Restrict from patient contact Until cleared by medical evaluation IB 
Staphylococcus aureus 
infection 
Active, draining skin Restrict from contact with patients and patient’s Until lesions have resolved IB 
lesions environment or food handling 
Carrier state No restriction, unless personnel are epidemiologi- IB 
cally linked to transmission of the organism 
Streptococcal infection, Restrict from patient care, contact with patient’s Until 24 hours after adequate treat- IB 
group A environment, or food handling ment started 
Tuberculosis 
Active disease Exclude from duty Until proved noninfectious IA 
PPD converter No restriction IA 
Continued 
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Table 3. Continued 
Disease/problem Work restriction Duration Category 
Varicella 
Active Exclude from duty Until all lesions dry and crust IA 
Postexposure (susceptible Exclude from duty From 10th day after 1st exposure IA 
personnel) through 21st day (28th day if VZIG 
given) after last exposure 
Zoster 
Localized, in healthy Cover lesions; restrict from care of high-risk Until all lesions dry and crust II 
person patients† 
Generalized or localized Restrict from patient contact Until all lesions dry and crust IB 
in immunosuppressed 
person 
Postexposure Restrict from patient contact From 10th day after 1st exposure IA 
(Susceptible personnel) through 21st day (28th day if VZIG 
given) after last exposure or, if varicel­
la occurs, until all lesions dry and 
crust 
Viral respiratory infections, Consider excluding from the care of high risk IB 
acute febrile patients‡ or contact with their environment dur- Until acute symptoms resolve 
ing community outbreak of RSV and influenza 
6. Health counseling 
Access to adequate health counseling for per­
sonnel is another crucial element of an effective 
personnel health service. Health counseling 
allows personnel to receive individually targeted 
information regarding (a) the risk and prevention 
of occupationally acquired infections, (b) the risk 
of illness or other adverse outcome after expo­
sures, (c) management of exposures, including the 
risks and benefits of postexposure prophylaxis 
regimens, and (d) the potential consequences of 
exposures or communicable diseases for family 
members, patients, or other personnel, both 
inside and outside the health care facility. 
7. Maintenance of records, data management, 
and confidentiality 
Maintenance of records on medical evaluations, 
immunizations, exposures, postexposure prophy­
laxis, and screening tests in a retrievable, prefer­
ably computerized, database allows efficient mon­
itoring of the health status of personnel. Such 
record keeping also helps to ensure that the orga­
nization will provide consistent and appropriate 
services to health care personnel. 
Individual records for all personnel should be 
maintained in accordance with the Occu­
pational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) medical records standard, which 
requires the employer to retain records, main­
tain employee confidentiality, and provide 
records to employees when they ask to review 
them.26 In addition, the 1991 OSHA “Occu­
pational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens; 
Final Rule”27 requires employers, including 
health care facilities, to establish and maintain 
an accurate record for each employee with occu­
pational exposure to bloodborne pathogens. The 
standard also requires that each employer 
ensure that the employee medical records are 
(a) kept confidential, (b) not disclosed or report­
ed without the employee’s express written con­
sent to any person within or outside the work­
place, except as required by law, and (c) main­
tained by the employer for at least the duration 
of the worker’s employment plus 30 years. 
OSHA’s record keeping regulation also requires 
employers to record work-related injuries and ill­
nesses on the OSHA 200 log and the OSHA 101 
form. The records include all occupational fatali­
ties, all occupational illnesses, and occupational 
injuries that result in loss of consciousness, 
restriction of work or motion, transfer to another 
job, or medical treatment beyond first aid. 
Infectious diseases are recordable if they are work 
related and result in illness.28 
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More recently, OSHA developed policies that 
require the recording of positive tuberculin skin-
test results.29 It would be beneficial to health care 
organizations and personnel if the principles of 
record keeping and confidentiality mandated by 
OSHA were to be expanded to other work-related 
exposures and incidents, immunizations, TB 
screening, and investigation and management of 
nosocomial outbreaks. 
E. EPIDEMIOLOGY AND CONTROL OF 
SELECTED INFECTIONS TRANSMITTED 
AMONG HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL AND 
PATIENTS 
Almost any transmissible infection may occur 
in the community at large or within health care 
organizations and can affect both personnel and 
patients. Only those infectious diseases that occur 
frequently in the health care setting or are most 
important to personnel are discussed here. 
1. Bloodborne pathogens 
a. Overview 
Assessment of the risk and prevention of trans­
mission of bloodborne pathogens, such as hepati­
tis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), and 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), in health 
care settings are based on information from a 
variety of sources, including surveillance and 
investigation of suspected cases of transmission 
to health care personnel and patients, seropreva­
lence surveys of health care personnel and 
patients, and studies of the risk of seroconversion 
after exposure to blood or other body fluids from 
infected persons. In this document, the emphasis 
of the discussion of bloodborne pathogens will be 
on patient-to-personnel transmission. 
The CDC has periodically issued and updated 
recommendations for prevention of transmission 
of bloodborne pathogens in health care settings; 
these provide detailed information and guid­
ance.30-40 Also, in 1991 OSHA published a blood-
borne pathogen standard that was based on the 
concept of universal precautions to prevent occu­
pational exposure to bloodborne pathogens.27 The 
use of standard precautions (which incorporates 
universal precautions), including appropriate 
handwashing and barrier precautions, will reduce 
contact with blood and body fluids.3,30,31,41 The use 
of engineering controls (e.g., safety devices) and 
changes in work practices (e.g., techniques to 
reduce handling of sharp instruments) can reduce 
the frequency of percutaneous injuries.41,42 In set­
tings such as the operating room, changes in 
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instrument design and techniques for performing 
surgical procedures and modified personal barri­
ers have been shown to reduce blood contacts.43,44 
Despite adherence to standard precautions and 
implementation of some new techniques and 
devices, percutaneous injuries continue to occur. 
This is of concern because percutaneous injuries 
represent the greatest risk of transmission of 
bloodborne pathogens to health care personnel.45 
Only a few studies evaluating a limited number of 
safety devices have demonstrated a reduction in 
percutaneous injuries among health care work­
ers.46,47 This document will not address the use of 
safety devices, because the Public Health Service 
is assessing the need for further guidance on 
selection, implementation, and evaluation of such 
devices in health care settings. 
The risk posed to patients by health care per­
sonnel infected with bloodborne pathogens such 
as HBV and HIV has been the subject of much 
concern and debate. There are no data to indi­
cate that infected workers who do not perform 
invasive procedures pose a risk to patients. 
Consequently, work restrictions for these work­
ers are not appropriate. However, the extent to 
which infected workers who perform certain 
types of invasive procedures pose a risk to 
patients and the restrictions that should be 
imposed on these workers have been much more 
controversial. In 1991, CDC recommendations 
on this issue were published.48 Subsequently, 
Congress mandated that each state implement 
the CDC guidelines or equivalent as a condition 
for continued federal public health funding to 
that state. Although all states have complied with 
this mandate, there is a fair degree of state-to­
state variation regarding specific provisions. 
Local or state public health officials should be 
contacted to determine the regulations or rec­
ommendations applicable in a given area. CDC is 
currently in the process of reviewing relevant 
data regarding health care personnel–to–patient 
transmission of bloodborne pathogens. 
b. Hepatitis B 
Nosocomial transmission of HBV is a serious 
risk for health care personnel.49-53 Approximately 
1000 health care personnel were estimated to 
have become infected with HBV in 1994. This 
90% decline since 1985 is attributable to the use 
of vaccine and adherence to other preventive mea­
sures (e.g., standard precautions).54 During the 
past decade, an estimated 100 to 200 health care 
personnel annually have died of occupationally 
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Table 4. Recommendation for postexposure prophylaxis for percutaneous or permucosal exposure to hepatitis B 
virus, United States 
Vaccination and antibody 
status of exposed person HBsAg seropositive 
Treatment when source is 
HBsAg negative 
Treatment when source is not tested 
or status is unknown 









HBIG* × 2 or HBIG* × 1 and 
initiate revaccination 
No treatment 
No treatment If known high-risk source, treat 
as if source were HBsAg positive 
Antibody response unknown Test exposed person for anti-HBs: 
(1) if adequate,† no treatment;  
(2) if inadequate,† HBIG × 1 and 
vaccine booster 
No treatment Test exposed person for anti-HBs: 
(1) if adequate,† no treatment; 
(2) if inadequate,† initiate 
revaccination 
HBsAg, Hepatitis B surface antigen; HBIG, hepatitis B immune globulin; HB, hepatitis vaccine; anti-HBs, antibody to hepatitis B surface antigen. 
*Dose 0.06 mg/kg IM. 
†Responder is defined as a person with adequate serum levels of anti-HBs (≥ 10 mIU/ml); inadequate vaccination defined as serum anti-HBs <10 mIU/ml. 
HBV infection from occupational exposure is 
dependent on the nature and frequency of expo­
sure to blood or to body fluids containing 
blood.49,53 The risk of infection is at least 30% after 
a percutaneous exposure to blood from a hepatitis 
B e antigen–seropositive source.54 
HBV is transmitted by percutaneous or 
mucosal exposure to blood and serum-derived 
body fluids from persons who have either acute 
or chronic HBV infection. The incubation peri­
od is 45 to 180 days (average 60 to 90 days). Any 
person seropositive for hepatitis B surface anti­
gen (HBsAg) is potentially infectious. 
Hepatitis B vaccination of health care personnel 
who have contact with blood and body fluids can 
prevent transmission of HBV and is strongly rec­
ommended.9,10,40 The OSHA bloodborne pathogen 
standard mandates that hepatitis B vaccine be 
made available, at the employer’s expense, to all 
health care personnel with occupational exposure 
to blood or other potentially infectious materials.27 
Provision of vaccine during training of health care 
professionals before such blood exposure occurs 
may both increase the vaccination rates among 
personnel and prevent infection among trainees, 
who are at increased risk for unintentional injuries 
while they are learning techniques. 
Prevaccination serologic screening for suscepti­
bility to HBV infection is not indicated for per­
sons being vaccinated, unless the health care 
organization considers such screening to be cost-
effective. Postvaccination screening for antibody 
to HBsAg (anti-HBs) is advised for personnel at 
ongoing risk for blood exposure to determine 
whether response to vaccinations has occurred 
and to aid in determining the appropriate postex­
posure prophylaxis or the need for revaccination. 
Personnel who do not respond to or do not com­
plete the primary vaccination series should be 
revaccinated with a second three-dose vaccine 
series or evaluated to determine whether they are 
HBsAg seropositive. Revaccinated persons should 
be tested for anti-HBs at the completion of the 
second vaccine series.9 If they do not respond, no 
further vaccination series should be given and 
they should be evaluated for the presence of 
HBsAg (possible chronic HBV infection). No spe­
cific work restrictions are recommended for non-
responders; in the event of percutaneous exposure 
to blood or body fluids, however, they should see 
their health care providers as soon as possible to 
evaluate the need for postexposure prophylaxis. 
Personnel in chronic dialysis centers who do not 
respond to vaccine need to be screened for HBsAg 
and anti-HBs every 6 months.55 
Vaccine-induced antibodies decline gradually 
with time, and as many as 60% of those who ini­
tially respond to vaccination will lose detectable 
anti-HBs by 8 years.56 Booster doses of vaccine 
are not routinely recommended, because per­
sons who respond to the initial vaccine series 
remain protected against clinical hepatitis and 
chronic infection even when their anti-HBs lev­
els become low or undetectable.57 
The need for postexposure prophylaxis, vacci­
nation, or both depends on the HBsAg status of 
the source of the exposure as well as the immu­
nization status of the person exposed (Table 4).40 
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Vaccine should be offered after any exposure in 
an unvaccinated person; if the source is known to 
be HBsAg seropositive, hepatitis B immune glob­
ulin (HBIG) should be given, preferably within 24 
hours. The effectiveness of HBIG given later than 
7 days after HBV exposure is unknown.8,10,40 If the 
source is HBsAg seropositive and the exposed 
person is known not to have responded to a three-
dose vaccine series, a single dose of HBIG and a 
dose of hepatitis B vaccine need to be given as 
soon as possible after the exposure with subse­
quent vaccine doses given at 1 month and 6 
months after the initial dose. If the exposed per­
son is known not to have responded to a three-
dose vaccine series and to revaccination, two 
doses of HBIG need to be given, one dose as soon 
as possible after exposure and the second dose 1 
month later. 
c. Hepatitis C 
HCV is the etiologic agent in most cases of par­
enterally transmitted non-A, non-B hepatitis in 
the United States.58,59 During the past decade, the 
annual number of newly acquired HCV infections 
has ranged from an estimated 180,000 in 1984 to 
an estimated 28,000 in 1995. Of these, an estimat­
ed 2% to 4% occurred among health care person­
nel who were occupationally exposed to blood.59 
A case-control study of patients with acute 
non-A, non-B hepatitis, conducted before the 
identification of HCV, showed a significant asso­
ciation between acquisition of disease and 
health care employment, specifically patient 
care or laboratory work.60 Seroprevalence stud­
ies among hospital-based health care personnel 
have shown seroprevalence rates of antibody to 
HCV (anti-HCV) ranging from 1% to 2%.61-64 In a 
study that assessed risk factors for infection in 
health care personnel, a history of accidental 
needlesticks was independently associated with 
anti-HCV seropositivity.61 
Several case reports have documented transmis­
sion of HCV infection from anti-HCV–seropositive 
patients to health care personnel as a result of 
accidental needlesticks or cuts with sharp instru­
ments.65,66 In follow-up studies of health care per­
sonnel who sustained percutaneous exposures to 
blood from anti-HCV–seropositive patients, the 
rate of anti-HCV seroconversion averaged 1.8% 
(range 0% to 7%).67-70 In a study in which HCV 
RNA polymerase chain reaction methods were 
used to measure HCV infection, the rate of HCV 
transmission was 10%.70 
The incubation period for hepatitis C is 6 to 7 
weeks, and nearly all persons with acute infec-
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tion will have chronic HCV infection occur with 
persistent viremia and the potential for trans­
mission of HCV to others. 
Serologic assays to detect anti-HCV are com­
mercially available. The interpretation of anti-
HCV test results is limited by several factors: (a) 
these assays will not detect anti-HCV in approxi­
mately 5% of persons infected with HCV; (b) these 
assays do not distinguish between acute, chronic, 
and past infection; (c) there may be a prolonged 
interval between the onset of acute illness with 
HCV and seroconversion; and (d) when the assays 
are used in populations with a low prevalence of 
HCV infection, commercial screening assays for 
anti-HCV yield a high proportion (as great as 
50%) of false-positive results.34,59 Although no true 
confirmatory test has been developed, supplemen­
tal tests for specificity are available and should be 
used to judge the validity of repeatedly reactive 
results by screening assays. 
Although the value of immune globulin for 
postexposure prophylaxis after occupational 
exposure to HCV has been difficult to assess,71-73 
postexposure prophylaxis with immune globulin 
does not appear to be effective in preventing HCV 
infection. Current immune globulin preparations 
are manufactured from plasma that has been 
screened for HCV antibody; positive lots are 
excluded from use. An experimental study in 
chimpanzees found that administration 1 hour 
after exposure to HCV of immune globulin manu­
factured from anti-HCV–screened plasma did not 
prevent infection or disease.74 Thus, available data 
do not support the use of immune globulin for 
postexposure prophylaxis against hepatitis C, and 
its use is not recommended. There is no informa­
tion regarding the use of antiviral agents, such as 
interferon alfa, in the postexposure setting, and 
such prophylaxis is not recommended.37 
Health care institutions should consider imple­
menting recommended policies and procedures 
for follow-up for HCV infection after percuta­
neous or mucosal exposures to blood. At a mini­
mum, such policies can include (1) baseline test­
ing of the source for anti-HCV, (2) baseline and 
follow-up testing (e.g., 6 months) for anti-HCV 
and alanine aminotransferase activity of the per­
son exposed to an anti-HCV seropositive source, 
(3) confirmation by supplemental anti-HCV test­
ing of all anti-HCV results reported as repeatedly 
active by enzyme immunoassay, (4) recommen­
dation against postexposure prophylaxis with 
immune globulin or antiviral agents (e.g., inter­
feron), and (5) education of health care personnel 
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about the risk for and prevention of bloodborne 
infections, including HCV, in occupational set­
tings, with the information routinely updated to 
ensure accuracy.37 Among health care personnel 
in the postexposure period, onset of HCV infec­
tion may be detected earlier by measuring HCV 
RNA with polymerase chain reaction rather than 
by measuring anti-HCV with enzyme immunoas­
say. However, polymerase chain reaction is not a 
licensed assay, and the accuracy of the results are 
highly variable.37 
d. Human immunodeficiency virus 
Nosocomial transmission of human immuno­
deficiency virus (HIV) infection from patients to 
health care personnel may occur after percuta­
neous or, infrequently, mucocutaneous exposure 
to blood or body fluids containing blood. 
According to prospective studies of health care 
personnel percutaneously exposed to HIV-infect­
ed blood, the average risk for HIV infection has 
been estimated to be 0.3%.45,75-78 A retrospective 
case-control study to identify risk factors for HIV 
seroconversion among health care personnel 
after a percutaneous exposure to HIV-infected 
blood found that they were more likely to become 
infected if they were exposed to a larger quantity 
of blood, represented in the study as (1) presence 
of visible blood on the device before injury, (2) a 
procedure that involved a needle placed directly 
in the patient’s vein or artery, or (3) deep injury.45 
Transmission of HIV infection also was associat­
ed with injuries in which the source patient was 
terminally ill with AIDS; this may be attributable 
to the increased titer of HIV in blood that is 
known to accompany late stages of illness or pos­
sibly to other factors, such as the presence of syn­
cytia-inducing strains of HIV in these patients. In 
addition, the findings of this study suggested that 
the postexposure use of zidovudine may be pro­
tective for health care personnel.45 
Factors that determine health care personnel’s 
risk of infection with HIV include the prevalence 
of infection among patients, the risk of infection 
transmission after an exposure, and the fre­
quency and nature of exposures.79 Most person­
nel who acquire infection after percutaneous 
exposure have HIV antibody develop within 6 
months of exposure. HIV-infected persons are 
likely to transmit virus from the time of early 
infection throughout life. 
In 1990, CDC published guidelines for postex­
posure management of occupational exposure 
to HIV,33 and provisional recommendations for 
postexposure chemoprophylaxis were published 
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in 1996.80 In 1998, both of these documents were 
updated and consolidated to reflect current sci­
entific knowledge on the efficacy of postexpo­
sure prophylaxis and the use of antiretroviral 
therapies.81 The U.S. Public Health Service will 
periodically review scientific information on 
antiretroviral therapies and publish updated 
recommendations for their use as postexposure 
prophylaxis as necessary. 
2. Conjunctivitis 
Although conjunctivitis can be caused by a vari­
ety of bacteria and viruses, adenovirus has been 
the primary cause of nosocomial outbreaks of 
conjunctivitis. Nosocomial outbreaks of conjunc­
tivitis caused by other pathogens are rare. 
Adenoviruses, which can cause respiratory, 
ocular, genitourinary, and gastrointestinal 
infections, are a major cause of epidemic kera­
toconjunctivitis in the community and health 
care settings. Nosocomial outbreaks have pri­
marily occurred in eye clinics or offices but 
have also been reported in neonatal intensive 
care units and long-term care facilities.82-86 
Patients and health care personnel have 
acquired and transmitted epidemic keratocon­
junctivitis during these outbreaks. The incuba­
tion period ranges from 5 to 12 days, and shed­
ding of virus occurs from late in the incubation 
period to as long as 14 days after onset of dis­
ease.83 Adenovirus survives for long periods on 
environmental surfaces; ophthalmologic instru­
ments and equipment can become contaminat­
ed and transmit infection. Contaminated hands 
are also a major source of person-to-person 
transmission of adenovirus, both from patients 
to health care personnel and from health care 
personnel to patients. Handwashing, glove use, 
and disinfection of instruments can prevent the 
transmission of adenovirus.82,83 
Infected personnel should not provide patient 
care for the duration of symptoms after onset of 
epidemic keratoconjunctivitis82,83 or purulent con­
junctivitis caused by other pathogens. 
3. Cytomegalovirus 
There are two principal reservoirs of 
cytomegalovirus (CMV) in health care institu­
tions: (a) infants and young children infected with 
CMV and (b) immunocompromised patients, such 
as those undergoing solid-organ or bone-marrow 
transplantation or those with AIDS.87-94 However, 
personnel who provide care to such high-risk 
patients have a rate of primary CMV infection that 
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is no higher than that among personnel without 
such patient contact (3% vs 2%).95-101 In areas 
where there are patient populations with a high 
prevalence of CMV, seroprevalence studies and 
epidemiologic investigations have also demon­
strated that personnel who care for patients have 
no greater risk of acquiring CMV than do person­
nel who have no patient contact.92,95-98,100,102-107 In 
addition, epidemiologic studies that included 
DNA testing of viral strains have demonstrated 
that personnel who acquired CMV infections 
while providing care to CMV-infected infants had 
not acquired their infections from the CMV-infect­
ed patients.88,92,96,108-110 
CMV transmission appears to occur directly either 
through close, intimate contact with an excreter of 
CMV or through contact with contaminated secre­
tions or excretions, especially saliva or urine.101,111-114 
Transmission by the hands of personnel or infected 
persons has also been suggested.92,115 The incubation 
period for person-to-person transmission is not 
known. Although CMV can survive on environmen­
tal surfaces and other objects for short periods,116 
there is no evidence that the environment plays a 
role in the transmission of infection.92 
Because infection with CMV during pregnancy 
may have adverse effects on the fetus, women of 
childbearing age need to be counseled regarding 
the risks and prevention of transmission of CMV 
in both nonoccupational and occupational set­
tings.117 Although most fetal infections follow pri­
mary maternal infection, fetal infection may fol­
low maternal reinfection or reactivation.118,119 
There are no studies that clearly indicate that 
seronegative personnel may be protected from 
infection by transfer to areas with less contact 
with patients likely to be reservoirs for CMV infec­
tion.88,92,95-97,102,105,106,119,120 
Serologic or virologic screening programs to 
identify CMV-infected patients or seronegative 
female personnel of childbearing age are imprac­
tical and costly for the following reasons: (a) the 
virus can be intermittently shed,121 and repeated 
screening tests may be needed to identify shed­
ders; (b) seropositivity for CMV does not offer 
complete protection against maternal reinfection 
or reactivation and subsequent fetal infec­
tion118,119; and (c) no currently available vac­
cines122-125 or prophylactic therapy90,126-129 can pro­
vide protection against primary infection. 
Work restrictions for personnel who contract CMV 
illnesses are not necessary. The risk of transmission 
of CMV can be reduced by careful adherence to 




Nosocomial transmission of diphtheria among 
patients and personnel has been reported.131-133 
Diphtheria is currently a rare disease in the United 
States. During 1980 through 1994, only 41 diphthe­
ria cases were reported134; however, community out­
breaks of diphtheria have occurred in the past,135 
and clusters of infection may occur in communities 
where diphtheria was previously endemic.136 In 
addition, diphtheria epidemics have been occurring 
since 1990 in the new independent states of the for­
mer Soviet Union137-139 and in Thailand.140 At least 20 
imported cases of diphtheria have been reported in 
countries in Europe,139,141 and two cases occurred in 
U.S. citizens visiting or working in the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine.142 Health care personnel 
are not at substantially higher risk than the general 
adult population for acquiring diphtheria; however, 
there is a potential for sporadic or imported cases to 
require medical care in the United States. 
Diphtheria, caused by Corynebacterium diphthe­
riae, is transmitted by contact with respiratory 
droplets or contact with skin lesions of infected 
patients. The incubation period is usually 2 to 5 
days. Patients with diphtheria are usually infec­
tious for 2 weeks or less, but communicability can 
persist for several months.143 Droplet precautions 
are recommended for patients with pharyngeal 
symptoms, and contact precautions are recom­
mended for patients with cutaneous lesions. 
Precautions need to be maintained until antibiotic 
therapy is completed and results of two cultures 
taken at least 24 hours apart are negative.3 
Limited serosurveys conducted since 1977 in the 
United States indicate that 22% to 62% of adults 
18 to 39 years old may lack protective diphtheria 
antibody levels.144-148 Prevention of diphtheria is 
best accomplished by maintaining high levels of 
diphtheria immunity among children and 
adults.19,137,138 Immunization with tetanus and 
diphtheria toxoid (Td) is recommended every 10 
years for all adults who have completed the pri­
mary immunization series (Table 1).9,19 Health care 
personnel need to consider obtaining Td immu­
nization from their health care providers.9 
To determine whether health care personnel 
directly exposed to oral secretions of patients 
infected with toxigenic strains of C. diphtheriae are 
carriers, cultures of the nasopharynx may be 
obtained. Exposed personnel need to be evaluated 
for evidence of disease daily for 1 week.149 Although 
the efficacy of antimicrobial prophylaxis in pre­
venting secondary disease has not been proved, 
prophylaxis with either a single intramuscular 
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Table 5. Selected reported etiologic agents causing community-acquired or nosocomially acquired gastrointestinal 
infections in developed countries 
Community- Nosocomially Nosocomially 
acquired, acquired, acquired, health 
Agent patients patients care personnel 
Bacterial 
Bacillus cereus ++ 0 0 
Campylobacter species ++++ + 0 
Clostridium difficile + ++++ + 
Clostridium perfringens + + 0 
Diarrheogenic Escherichia coli ++++ ++ + 
Salmonella species +++ ++ + 
Shigella species ++ + + 
S. aureus, toxigenic +++ +++ 0 
Yersinia enterocolitica + + + 
Viral 
Adenovirus ++ + + 
Astrovirus * * ? 
Calicivirus (Norwalk and Norwalk-like viruses or SRSVs) * * * 
Coxsackievirus ++ + + 
Rotavirus ++++ ++++ ++ 
Fungal 
Candida species + + 0 
Cryptococcus neoformans ++ + 0 
Parasitic 
Cryptosporidium ++ + + 
Cyclospora ++ 0 0 
Entamoeba histolytica ++ + 0 
Giardia lamblia ++ + 0 
Isospora belli + 0 0 
Strongyloides + 0 0 
++++, Most frequently reported; +++, reported often; ++, occasionally reported; +, rarely reported; 0, never reported; *, common but rarely reported 
because of limited availability of diagnostic assays; ?, unknown; SRSV, small round-structured viruses. 
injection of benzathine penicillin (1.2 mouse units) 
or oral erythromycin (1 gm/day) for 7 days has 
been recommended.19 Follow-up nasopharyngeal 
cultures for C. diphtheriae need to be obtained at 
least 2 weeks after antimicrobial therapy is com­
pleted. If the organism has not been eradicated, a 
10-day course of erythromycin needs to be given.149 
In addition, previously immunized exposed per­
sonnel need to receive a dose of Td if they have not 
been vaccinated within the previous 5 years.19 
Exclusion from duty is indicated for personnel 
with C. diphtheriae infection or those determined to 
be asymptomatic carriers until antimicrobial ther­
apy is completed and nasopharyngeal culture 
results are negative. 
5. Gastrointestinal infections, acute 
Gastrointestinal infections may be caused by a 
variety of agents, including bacteria, viruses, and 
protozoa. However, only a few agents have been 
documented in nosocomial transmission (Table 
5).150-168 Nosocomial transmission of agents that 
cause gastrointestinal infections usually results 
from contact with infected individuals,150,161,163,169 
from consumption of contaminated food, water, 
or other beverages,150,166,169,170 or from exposure to 
contaminated objects or environmental sur­
faces.152,153,171 Airborne transmission of small 
round-structured viruses (Norwalk-like viruses) 
has been postulated but not proved.164,165,172-175 
Inadequate handwashing by health care person­
nel176 and inadequate sterilization or disinfection 
of patient-care equipment and environmental sur­
faces increase the likelihood of transmission of 
agents that cause gastrointestinal infections. 
Generally, adherence to good personal hygiene by 
personnel before and after all contacts with 
patients or food and to either standard or contact 
precautions3 will minimize the risk of transmit­
ting enteric pathogens.167,177 
Laboratory personnel who handle infectious 
materials also may be at risk for occupational 
acquisition of gastrointestinal infections, most 
commonly with Salmonella typhi. Although the 
incidence of laboratory-acquired S. typhi infec­
tion has decreased substantially since 1955, 
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infections continue to occur among laboratory 
workers, particularly those performing profi­
ciency exercises or research tests.151,162 Several 
typhoid vaccines are available for use in labo­
ratory workers who regularly work with cul­
tures or clinical materials containing S. 
typhi.178 The oral live-attenuated Ty21a vaccine, 
the intramuscular Vi capsular polysaccharide 
vaccine, or the subcutaneous inactivated vac­
cine may be given (Table 1).178 Booster doses of 
vaccine are required at 2- to 5-year intervals, 
depending on the preparation used. The live-
attenuated Ty21a vaccine should not be used 
for immunocompromised persons, including 
those known to be infected with HIV.178 
Personnel who acquire an acute gastroin­
testinal illness (defined as vomiting, diarrhea, 
or both, with or without associated symptoms 
such as fever, nausea, and abdominal pain) are 
likely to have high concentrations of the infect­
ing agent in their feces (bacteria, viruses, and 
parasites) or vomitus (viruses and para­
sites).165,179,180 It is important to determine the 
etiology of gastrointestinal illness in health 
care personnel who care for patients at high 
risk for severe disease (e.g., neonates, elderly 
persons, and immunocompromised patients). 
The initial evaluation of personnel with gas­
troenteritis needs to include a thorough history 
and determination of the need for specific lab­
oratory tests, such as stool or blood cultures, 
staining procedures, and serologic or antigen-
antibody tests.162,171,181,182 
After resolution of some acute bacterial gas­
trointestinal illnesses, some personnel may 
have persistent carriage of the infectious agent. 
Once the person has clinically recovered and is 
having formed stools, however, the risk of trans­
mission of enteric pathogens is minimized by 
adherence to standard precautions.3,167 In addi­
tion, appropriate antimicrobial therapy may 
eradicate fecal carriage of Shigella183 or 
Campylobacter.184 In contrast, antimicrobial or 
antiparasitic therapy may not eliminate car­
riage of Salmonella185 or Cryptosporidium. 
Moreover, antimicrobials may prolong excre­
tion of Salmonella186 and lead to emergence of 
resistant strains.187 However, transmission of 
Salmonella to patients from personnel who are 
asymptomatic carriers of Salmonella has not 
been well documented.167 In general, antimicro­
bial therapy is not recommended, unless the 
person is at high risk for severe disease.188 
When antibiotics are given, stool cultures 
AJIC 
June 1998 
should be obtained at least 48 hours after com­
pletion of antibiotic therapy. 
Restriction from patient care and the 
patient’s environment or from food handling is 
indicated for personnel with diarrhea or acute 
gastrointestinal symptoms, regardless of the 
causative agent.3,171 Some local and state agen­
cies have regulations that require work exclu­
sion for health care personnel, food handlers, 
or both who have gastrointestinal infections 
caused by Salmonella or Shigella. These regula­
tions may require such personnel to be restrict­
ed from duty until results of at least two con­
secutive stool cultures obtained at least 24 
hours apart are negative. 
6. Hepatitis A 
Nosocomial hepatitis A occurs infrequently, 
and transmission to personnel usually occurs 
when the source patient has unrecognized 
hepatitis and is fecally incontinent or has 
diarrhea.189-198 Other risk factors for hepatitis 
A virus (HAV) transmission to personnel 
include activities that increase the risk of 
fecal-oral contamination such as (a) eating or 
drinking in patient care areas,189,191,193,199 (b) 
not washing hands after handling an infected 
infant,191,199,200 and (c) sharing food, beverages, 
or cigarettes with patients, their families, or 
other staff members.189,191 
HAV is transmitted primarily by the fecal-oral 
route. It has not been reported to occur after 
inadvertent needlesticks or other contact with 
blood, but it has rarely been reported to be 
transmitted by transfusion of blood prod­
ucts.193,201,202 The incubation period for HAV is 
15 to 50 days. Fecal excretion of HAV is greatest 
during the incubation period of disease before 
the onset of jaundice.203 Once disease is clini­
cally obvious, the risk of transmitting infection 
is decreased. However, some patients admitted 
to the hospital with HAV, particularly immuno­
compromised patients, may still be shedding 
virus because of prolonged or relapsing disease, 
and such patients are potentially infective.190,203 
Fecal shedding of HAV, formerly believed to 
continue only as long as 2 weeks after onset of 
dark urine,203 has been shown to occur as late as 
6 months after diagnosis of infection in prema­
ture infants.189 Anicteric infection is typical in 
young children and infants.204 
Personnel can protect themselves and others 
from infection with HAV by adhering to stan­
dard precautions.3 Food-borne transmission of 
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hepatitis A is not discussed in this guideline, 
but it has occurred in health care settings.205,206 
Two inactivated hepatitis A vaccines are now 
available and provide long-term preexposure 
protection against clinical infection with 
greater than 94% efficacy.204 Serologic surveys 
among health care personnel have not shown 
greater prevalence of HAV infection than in 
control populations52,192,207,208; therefore, routine 
administration of vaccine in health care person­
nel is not recommended. Vaccine may be useful 
for personnel working or living in areas where 
HAV is highly endemic and is indicated for per­
sonnel who handle HAV-infected primates or 
are exposed to HAV in a research laboratory. 
The role of hepatitis A vaccine in controlling 
outbreaks has not been adequately investigat­
ed.9 Immune globulin given within 2 weeks 
after an HAV exposure is more than 85% effec­
tive in preventing HAV infection204 and may be 
advisable in some outbreak situations.9,204 
Restriction from patient care areas or food 
handling is indicated for personnel with HAV 
infection. They may return to regular duties 1 
week after onset of illness.9 
7. Herpes simplex 
Nosocomial transmission of herpes simplex virus 
(HSV) is rare. Nosocomial transmission has been 
reported in nurseries209-211 and intensive care 
units212,213 where high-risk patients (e.g., neonates, 
patients with severe malnutrition, patients with 
severe burns or eczema, and immunocompromised 
patients) are located. Nosocomial transmission of 
HSV occurs primarily through contact either with 
primary or recurrent lesions or with virus-contain­
ing secretions, such as saliva, vaginal secretions, or 
amniotic fluid.210,212,214 Exposed areas of skin are 
the most likely sites of nosocomial infection, par­
ticularly when minor cuts, abrasions, or other skin 
lesions are present.213 The incubation period of 
HSV is 2 to 14 days.215 The duration of viral shed­
ding has not been well defined.216 
Personnel may acquire a herpetic infection of 
the fingers (herpetic whitlow or paronychia) from 
exposure to contaminated oral secretions.213,214 
Such exposures are a distinct hazard for nurses, 
anesthesiologists, dentists, respiratory care per­
sonnel, and other personnel who have direct (usu­
ally hand) contact with either oral lesions or res­
piratory secretions from patients.213 Less fre­
quently, personnel may acquire mucocutaneous 
infection on other body sites from contact with 
infectious body secretions.217 
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Personnel with active infection of the hands (her­
petic whitlow) can potentially transmit HSV infec­
tion to patients with whom they have contact.214 
Transmission of HSV from personnel with orofa­
cial HSV infection to patients has also been infre­
quently documented209; however, the magnitude of 
this risk is unknown.211,218 Although asymptomatic 
infected persons can shed the virus, they are less 
infectious than persons with active lesions.216,219 
Personnel can protect themselves from 
acquiring HSV by adhering to standard precau­
tions.3 The risk of transmission of HSV from 
personnel with orofacial infections to patients 
can be reduced by handwashing before all 
patient care and by the use of appropriate bar­
riers, such as a mask or gauze dressing, to pre­
vent hand contact with the lesion. 
Because personnel with orofacial lesions may 
touch their lesions and potentially transmit infec­
tions, they should be evaluated to determine their 
potential for transmitting herpes simplex to 
patients at high risk for serious disease (e.g., 
neonates, patients with severe malnutrition, 
patients with severe burns or eczema, and 
immunocompromised patients) and excluded 
from the care of such patients as indicated. The 
evaluation should consider the extent of the 
lesion and the severity of illness in the patient 
population that personnel will contact. Personnel 
with HSV infections of the fingers or hands can 
more easily transmit infection and therefore need 
to be excluded from patient care until their 
lesions have crusted. In addition, herpetic lesions 
may be secondarily infected by Staphylococcus 
and Streptococcus, and personnel with such 
infections should be evaluated to determine 
whether they need to be excluded from patient 
contact until the secondary infection has 
resolved. There have been no reports that person­
nel with genital HSV infections have transmitted 
HSV to patients; therefore, work restrictions for 
personnel with genital herpes are not indicated. 
8. Measles 
Nosocomial transmission of measles virus 
(sporadic and epidemic) has been well 
described.220-229 From 1985 through 1991, approx­
imately 3000 (4%) of all reported episodes of 
measles in the United States were probably 
acquired in a medical facility; of these, more than 
700 (25%) occurred in health care personnel, 
many of whom were not vaccinated.9 Data have 
suggested that health care personnel have a risk 
of measles 13-fold that of the general population.9 
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Of the 2765 episodes of measles reported during 
1992 through 1995, 385 (13.9%) occurred in 
health care settings.221,230 
Measles is transmitted both by large droplets 
during close contact between infected and sus­
ceptible persons and by the airborne route.229,231 
Measles is highly transmissible and frequently 
misdiagnosed during the prodromal stage. The 
incubation period for measles is 5 to 21 days. 
Immunocompetent persons with measles shed 
the virus from the nasopharynx, beginning with 
the prodrome until 3 to 4 days after rash onset; 
immunocompromised persons with measles 
may shed virus for extended periods.232 
Strategies to prevent nosocomial transmis­
sion of measles include (a) documentation of 
measles immunity in health care personnel, (b) 
prompt identification and isolation of persons 
with fever and rash, and (c) adherence to air­
borne precautions for suspected and proven 
cases of measles.3 
It is essential that all personnel have docu­
mentation of measles immunity, regardless of 
their length of employment or whether they are 
involved in patient care. Further, some states 
have regulations requiring measles immunity 
for health care personnel. Although persons 
born before 1957 are generally considered to be 
immune to measles, serologic studies indicate 
that 5% to 9% of health care personnel born 
immune.9,233,234before 1957 may not be 
Furthermore, during 1985 through 1989, 29% 
of all measles cases in U.S. health care person­
nel occurred in those born before 1957.221 
Consideration should be given to recommend­
ing a dose of measles-mumps-rubella trivalent 
vaccine (MMR) to personnel born before 1957 
who are unvaccinated and who lack (a) a histo­
ry of previous measles disease, (b) documenta­
tion of receipt of one dose of live-measles vac­
cine, and (c) serologic evidence of measles 
immunity.9 Health care personnel born during 
or after 1957 should be considered immune to 
measles when they have (a) documentation of 
physician-diagnosed measles, (b) documenta­
tion of two doses of live measles vaccine on or 
after their first birthday, or (c) serologic evi­
dence of measles immunity (persons with an 
“indeterminate” level of immunity on testing 
should be considered susceptible). Persons 
born between 1957 and 1984 who received 
childhood measles immunization were given 
only one dose of vaccine during infancy and 
may require a second dose of vaccine.8 
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Serologic screening for measles immunity is 
not necessary before administration of measles 
vaccine, unless the medical facility considers it 
cost-effective or the person to be vaccinated 
requests it.235-238 When serologic screening 
before vaccination is done, tracking systems 
are needed to ensure that those identified as 
susceptible are subsequently vaccinated in a 
timely manner.237 During measles outbreaks, 
serologic screening before vaccination is not 
necessary. In outbreak situations, prompt 
administration of vaccine is necessary to halt 
disease transmission. 
Work restrictions are necessary for personnel 
who acquire measles; they need to be excluded 
from duty for 7 days after the rash appears. 
Likewise, personnel not immune to measles 
need to be excluded from duty from 5 days 
after the first exposure to 21 days after the last 
exposure to measles. 
9. Meningococcal disease 
Community-acquired meningococcal disease is 
typically caused by a variety of serogroups of 
Neisseria meningitidis; serogroups B and C cause 
46% and 45% of the endemic cases, respectively. 
Serogroups A, Y, and W-135 account for nearly all 
the remaining endemic cases.15 In contrast, epidem­
ic meningococcal disease has, since the early 1990s, 
been caused increasingly by serogroup C.15,239,240 
Nosocomial transmission of N. meningitidis is 
uncommon. In rare instances, when proper pre­
cautions were not used, N. meningitidis has 
been transmitted from patient to personnel, 
through contact with the respiratory secretions 
of patients with meningococcemia or meningo­
coccal meningitis,241-243 or through handling 
laboratory specimens.241 Lower respiratory 
tract infections caused by N. meningitidis may 
present a greater risk of transmission than 
either meningococcemia or meningitis,243,244 
especially if the patient has an active, produc­
tive cough.244 The risk of personnel acquisition 
of meningococcal disease from casual contact 
(e.g., cleaning rooms or delivering food trays) 
appears to be negligible.244 
N. meningitidis infection is probably transmit­
ted by large droplets; the incubation period is 
from 2 to 10 days, and patients infected with N. 
meningitidis are rendered noninfectious by 24 
hours of effective therapy. Personnel who care for 
patients with suspected N. meningitidis infection 
can decrease their risk of infection by adhering to 
droplet precautions.3 
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Postexposure prophylaxis is advised for persons 
who have had intensive, unprotected contact (i.e., 
without wearing a mask) with infected patients 
(e.g., mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, endotracheal 
intubation, endotracheal tube management, or 
close examination of the oropharynx of 
patients).15 Antimicrobial prophylaxis can eradi­
cate carriage of N. meningitidis and prevent infec­
tions in personnel who have unprotected exposure 
to patients with meningococcal infections.245,246 
Because secondary cases of N. meningitidis 
occur rapidly (within the first week) after expo­
sure to persons with meningococcal disease,247 it 
is important to begin prophylactic therapy 
immediately after an intensive, unprotected 
exposure, often before results of antimicrobial 
testing are available. Prophylaxis administered 
later than 14 days after exposure is probably of 
limited or no value.15 Rifampin (600 mg orally 
every 12 hours for 2 days) is effective in eradi­
cating nasopharyngeal carriage of N. meningi­
tidis.245 Ciprofloxacin (500 mg orally) and ceftri­
axone (250 mg intramuscularly) in single-dose 
regimens are also effective in reducing nasopha­
ryngeal carriage of N. meningitidis and are rea­
sonable alternatives to the multidose rifampin 
regimen.15,246 These antimicrobials may be useful 
when infections are caused by rifampin-resistant 
meningococci or rifampin is contraindicated. 
Rifampin and ciprofloxacin are not recommend­
ed for pregnant women.15,106,248,249 
The quadrivalent A,C,Y,W-135 polysaccharide 
vaccine has been used successfully to control 
community outbreaks caused by serogroup 
C,15,239,240,248 but its use is not recommended for 
postexposure prophylaxis in health care settings.15 
However, preexposure vaccination may be consid­
ered for laboratory personnel who routinely han­
15,241dle soluble preparations of N. meningitidis.
Healthy persons may have nasopharyngeal car­
riage of N. meningitidis.245,250-252 Nosocomial trans­
mission from carriers to personnel has not been 
reported. In the absence of exposures to patients 
with N. meningitidis infection, personnel who are 
asymptomatic carriers need not be identified, 
treated, or removed from patient care activities. 
However, personnel with meningococcal infection 
need to be excluded from duty until 24 hours after 
the start of effective therapy. 
10. Mumps 
Mumps transmission has occurred in hospi­
tals and long-term care facilities housing adoles­
cents and young adults.253,254 Most cases of 
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mumps in health care personnel have been com­
munity acquired. 
Mumps is transmitted by contact with virus-
containing respiratory secretions, including sali­
va; the portals of entry are the nose and mouth. 
The incubation period varies from 12 to 25 days 
and is usually 16 to 18 days. The virus may be pre­
sent in saliva for 6 to 7 days before parotitis and 
may persist for as long as 9 days after onset of dis­
ease. Exposed personnel may be infectious for 12 
to 25 days after their exposure, and many infected 
persons remain asymptomatic.255 Droplet precau­
tions are recommended for patients with mumps; 
such precautions should be continued for 9 days 
after the onset of parotitis.3 
An effective vaccination program is the best 
approach to prevention of nosocomial mumps 
transmission.12 Vaccination with mumps virus vac­
cine is recommended, unless otherwise con­
traindicated, for all those who are susceptible to 
mumps;12,256 combined MMR is the vaccine of 
choice,257 especially when the recipient also is like­
ly to be susceptible to measles, rubella, or both. 
Personnel should be considered immune to 
mumps if they have (a) documentation of physi­
cian-diagnosed mumps, (b) documentation of 
receipt of one dose of live mumps vaccine on or 
after their first birthday, or (c) serologic evidence 
of immunity (individuals who have an “indeter­
minate” antibody level should be considered sus­
ceptible).12 Most persons born before 1957 are 
likely to have been infected naturally and may be 
considered to be immune, even though they may 
not have had clinically recognized mumps. 
Outbreaks among highly vaccinated populations 
have occurred and have been attributed to pri­
mary vaccine failure.258 
Work restrictions are necessary for personnel 
who acquire mumps; such restrictions should be 
imposed for 9 days after the onset of parotitis. 
Likewise, susceptible personnel who are exposed 
to mumps need to be excluded from duty from the 
12th day after the first exposure until the 26th day 
after the last exposure.9,255 
11. Parvovirus 
Human parvovirus B19 (B19) is the cause of 
erythema infectiosum (fifth disease), a common 
rash illness that is usually acquired in childhood. 
Immunocompetent persons infected with B19 
may have an acute, self-limited arthropathy, with 
or without a rash or anemia of short duration. 
However, patients with preexisting anemia (e.g., 
patients with sickle-cell anemia or thalassemia) 
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may have aplastic crisis occur. Immunodeficient 
patients (e.g., patients with leukemia or AIDS) 
may become chronically infected with B19 and 
have chronic anemia.259,260 
Transmission of B19 to health care personnel 
from infected patients appears to be rare but has 
been reported.261-265 In two investigations of health 
care personnel exposures to B19, the rate of infec­
tion among exposed nurses was not higher than 
the rate among unexposed control subjects.266,267 
In another investigation of health care personnel 
exposed to a patient with undetected chronic B19 
infection, none of the susceptible employees 
became infected.268 Personnel have acquired 
infection while working in laboratories or during 
the care of patients with B19-associated sickle-cell 
aplastic crises.263-265,269-271 
B19 may be transmitted through contact with 
infected persons, fomites, or large droplets.266,272,273 
The incubation period is variable, depending on 
the clinical manifestation of disease, and ranges 
from 6 to 10 days.260 The period of infectivity also 
varies, depending on the clinical presentation or 
stage of disease. Persons with erythema infectio­
sum are infectious before the appearance of the 
rash, those with infection and aplastic crises for as 
long as 7 days after onset of illness, and persons 
with chronic infection for years. 
Pregnant personnel are at no greater risk of 
acquiring B19 infection than are nonpregnant per­
sonnel; however, if a pregnant woman does acquire 
B19 infection during the first half of pregnancy, the 
risk of fetal death (fetal hydrops, spontaneous abor­
tion, and stillbirth) is increased.274,275 Because of the 
serious nature of the consequences for the fetus, 
female personnel of childbearing age need to be 
counseled regarding the risk of transmission of B19 
and appropriate infection control precautions.3 
Isolation precautions are not indicated for most 
patients with erythema infectiosum because they 
are past their period of infectiousness at the time 
of clinical illness.271,274 However, patients in aplas­
tic crisis from B19 or patients with chronic B19 
infection may transmit the virus to susceptible 
health care personnel or other patients; therefore, 
patients with preexisting anemia who are admit­
ted to the hospital with febrile illness and tran­
sient aplastic crises should remain on droplet pre­
cautions for 7 days and patients with known or 
suspected chronic infection with B19 should be 
placed on droplet precautions on admission and 
for the duration of hospitalization.3,263 Work 
restrictions are not necessary for personnel 




Nosocomial transmission of Bordetella pertus­
sis has involved both patients and personnel; 
nonimmunized children are at greatest risk.276-280 
Serologic studies of health care personnel indi­
cate that personnel may be exposed to and 
infected with pertussis much more frequently 
than indicated by the occurrence of recognized 
clinical illness.277,279,281,282 In one such study, the 
level of pertussis agglutination antibodies was 
found to correlate with the degree of patient con­
tact; the prevalence of such antibody was highest 
in pediatric house staff (82%) and ward nurses 
(71%) and lowest in nurses with administrative 
responsibilities (35%).277 
Pertussis is highly contagious; secondary attack 
rates exceed 80% in susceptible household con­
tacts.283-285 B. pertussis transmission occurs by con­
tact with respiratory secretions or large aerosol 
droplets from the respiratory tracts of infected per­
sons. The incubation period is usually 7 to 10 days. 
The period of communicability starts at the onset of 
the catarrhal stage and extends into the paroxysmal 
stage up to 3 weeks after onset of symptoms. 
Prevention of secondary transmission of pertussis is 
especially difficult during the early stages of the dis­
ease because pertussis is highly communicable in 
the catarrhal stage, when the symptoms are non­
specific and the diagnosis is uncertain. 
During nosocomial pertussis outbreaks, the risk 
of acquiring infection among patients or personnel 
is often difficult to quantify because exposure is not 
easily determined. Furthermore, clinical symptoms 
in adults are less severe than in children and may 
not be recognized as pertussis. Pertussis should be 
considered for any person seeking treatment with 
an acute cough lasting at least 7 days, particularly 
if accompanied by paroxysms of coughing, inspira­
tory whoop, or posttussive vomiting.280,281 
Prevention of transmission of B. pertussis in 
health care settings involves (a) early diagnosis 
and treatment of patients with clinical infection, 
(b) implementation of droplet precautions for 
infectious patients,3 (c) exclusion of infectious 
personnel from work, and (d) administration of 
postexposure prophylaxis to persons exposed to 
infectious patients.279 Patients with suspected or 
confirmed pertussis who are admitted to the hos­
pital need to be placed on droplet precautions 
until they have clinical improvement and have 
received antimicrobial therapy for at least 5 days. 
Vaccination of adolescents and adults with 
whole-cell B. pertussis vaccine is not recommend­
ed19 because local and systemic reactions have 
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been observed more frequently in these groups 
than in children. Acellular pertussis vaccine is 
immunogenic in adults and carries a lower risk of 
adverse events than does whole-cell vaccine.280,286 
However, the acellular vaccine has not been 
licensed for use in persons 7 years old or older. 
Because immunity among vaccine recipients 
wanes 5 to 10 years after the last vaccine dose 
(usually given at 4 to 6 years of age), personnel 
may play an important role in transmitting pertus­
sis to susceptible infants. However, additional 
studies are needed to assess whether booster doses 
of acellular vaccines are indicated for adults. 
Postexposure prophylaxis is indicated for person­
nel exposed to pertussis; a 14-day course of either 
erythromycin (500 mg orally four times daily) or 
trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole (one tablet twice 
daily) has been used for this purpose. The efficacy 
of such prophylaxis has not been well documented, 
but studies suggest that it may minimize transmis­
sion.19,279,287,288 There are no data on the efficacy of 
newer macrolides (clarithromycin or azithromycin) 
for prophylaxis in persons exposed to pertussis. 
Restriction from duty is indicated for personnel 
with pertussis from the beginning of the catarrhal 
stage through the third week after onset of parox­
ysms, or until 5 days after the start of effective 
antimicrobial therapy. Exposed personnel do not 
need to be excluded from duty. 
13. Poliomyelitis 
The last cases of indigenously acquired wild-
virus poliomyelitis occurred in the United States 
in 1979.289 Since then, all cases of endemic 
poliomyelitis reported in the United States (5 to 
10 endemic cases/year) have been related to the 
administration of oral polio vaccine (OPV).21 
Although the risk of transmission of poliovirus in 
the United States is very low, wild poliovirus may 
potentially be introduced into susceptible popula­
tions with low immunization levels. 
Poliovirus is transmitted through contact with 
feces or urine of infected persons but can be 
spread by contact with respiratory secretions 
and, in rare instances, through items contami­
nated with feces. The incubation period for non-
paralytic poliomyelitis is 3 to 6 days, but is usu­
ally 7 to 21 days for paralytic polio.290 Com­
municability is greatest immediately before and 
after the onset of symptoms, when the virus is in 
the throat and excreted in high concentration in 
feces. The virus can be recovered from the throat 
for 1 week and from feces for several weeks to 
months after onset of symptoms. 
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Vaccine-associated poliomyelitis may occur in the 
recipient (7 to 21 days after vaccine administration) 
or susceptible contacts of the vaccine recipient (20 to 
29 days after vaccine administration).289 Adults have 
a slightly increased risk of vaccine-associated para­
lytic poliomyelitis after receipt of OPV; therefore, 
inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) should be used 
when adult immunization is warranted.8,16,21 Also, 
because immunocompromised persons may be at 
greater risk for development of poliomyelitis after 
exposure to vaccine virus, IPV rather than OPV is rec­
ommended when vaccinating pregnant or immuno­
compromised personnel, or personnel who may have 
contact with immunocompromised patients.8,16,21,290 
Health care personnel who may have contact 
with patients excreting wild virus (e.g., imported 
poliomyelitis case) and laboratory personnel han­
dling specimens containing poliovirus or per­
forming cultures to amplify virus should receive a 
complete series of polio vaccine; if previously vac­
cinated, they may require a booster dose of either 
IPV or OPV.8,21 For situations where immediate 
protection is necessary (e.g., an imported case of 
wild-virus poliomyelitis requiring care), addition­
al doses of OPV should be given to adults who 
have previously completed a polio vaccine series.21 
14. Rabies 
Human rabies cases occur primarily from 
exposure to rabid animals. Cases of human rabies 
have increased in the United States during the 
1990s.291 Laboratory and animal care personnel 
who are exposed to infected animals, their tis­
sues, and their excretions are at risk for the dis­
ease. Also, rabies transmission to laboratory per­
sonnel has been reported in vaccine production 
and research facilities after exposure to high­
titered infectious aerosols.292,293 Theoretically, 
rabies may be transmitted to health care person­
nel from exposures (bite and nonbite) to saliva 
from infected patients, but no cases have been 
documented after these types of exposures.294 
It is also possible for rabies to be transmitted 
when other potentially infectious material (such 
as brain tissue) comes into contact with nonintact 
skin or mucous membranes.22,294 Bites that pene­
trate the skin, especially bites to the face and 
hands, pose the greatest risk of transmission of 
rabies virus from animals to human beings.22 The 
incubation period for rabies is usually 1 to 3 
months, but longer periods have been reported.295 
Exposures to rabies can be minimized by adher­
ing to standard precautions when caring for per­
sons with suspected or confirmed rabies3 and by 
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using proper biosafety precautions in laborato­
ries.5 Preexposure vaccination has been recom­
mended for all personnel who (a) work with 
rabies virus or infected animals or (b) engage in 
diagnostic, production, or research activities with 
rabies virus.5,22 Consideration also may be given to 
providing preexposure vaccination to animal han­
dlers when research animals are obtained from 
the wild, rather than from a known supplier that 
breeds the animals. 
Postexposure prophylaxis has been adminis­
tered to health care personnel after exposures to 
patients with rabies (Table 1),295-297 but decisions 
regarding postexposure prophylaxis should be 
made on a case-by-case basis after discussion with 
public health authorities.22 
15. Rubella 
Nosocomial transmission of rubella has 
occurred from both male and female personnel to 
other susceptible personnel and patients, as well 
as from patients to susceptible personnel and 
other patients.298-305 
Rubella is transmitted by contact with nasopha­
ryngeal droplets from infected persons. The incu­
bation period is variable but may range from 12 to 
23 days; most persons have the rash 14 to 16 days 
after exposure. The disease is most contagious 
when the rash is erupting, but virus may be shed 
from 1 week before to 5 to 7 days after the onset 
of the rash.306 Rubella in adults is usually a mild 
disease, lasting only a few days; 30% to 50% of 
cases may be subclinical or inapparent. 
Droplet precautions are used to prevent trans­
mission of rubella. Infants with congenital rubella 
may excrete virus for months to years; when caring 
for such patients, it is therefore advisable to use 
contact precautions for the first year of life, unless 
nasopharyngeal and urine culture results are nega­
tive for rubella virus after 3 months of age.3 
Ensuring immunity among all health care per­
sonnel (male and female) is the most effective 
way to eliminate nosocomial transmission of 
rubella.8,9,14,256,307 Persons should be considered 
susceptible to rubella if they lack (a) documenta­
tion of one dose of live rubella vaccine on or 
after their first birthday and (b) laboratory evi­
dence of immunity (persons with indeterminate 
levels are considered susceptible). A history of 
previous rubella infection is unreliable and 
should not be considered indicative of immunity 
to rubella. Although birth before 1957 is general­
ly considered acceptable evidence of rubella 
immunity, a dose of MMR has been recommend-
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ed for those health care personnel that do not 
have laboratory evidence of immunity.9 In addi­
tion, birth before 1957 is not considered accept­
able evidence of rubella immunity for women of 
childbearing age; history of vaccination or labo­
ratory evidence of rubella immunity is particu­
larly important for women who may become 
pregnant.9 Voluntary immunization programs 
are usually inadequate to ensure personnel pro­
tection.7,308 Because many health departments 
mandate rubella immunity for health care per­
sonnel, personnel health programs should con­
sult with their local or state health departments 
before establishing policies for their facilities. 
Serologic screening of personnel for immunity 
to rubella need not be done before vaccinating 
against rubella, unless the medical facility consid­
ers it cost-effective or the person getting vaccinat­
ed requests it.7,235-237 When serologic screening 
before vaccination is done, tracking systems are 
needed to ensure that those identified as suscepti­
ble are subsequently vaccinated in a timely man­
ner.237 Likewise, during rubella outbreaks, sero­
logic screening is not necessary. Pregnant women 
who are already immune to rubella are not at 
increased risk for adverse advents.309 However, for 
theoretic reasons, a risk to the fetus from admin­
istration of live-virus vaccines cannot be excluded. 
Women should be counseled to avoid pregnancy 
for 30 days after administration of MMR or other 
rubella-containing vaccines. Routine precautions 
for vaccinating postpubertal women include (a) 
asking whether they are or may be pregnant, (b) 
not vaccinating those who say they are or may be 
pregnant, and (c) vaccinating those who state they 
are not pregnant after the potential risk to the 
fetus has been explained. If a pregnant woman is 
vaccinated or a woman becomes pregnant within 
3 months after vaccination, she should be coun­
seled about the theoretic basis of concern for the 
fetus, but MMR vaccination during pregnancy 
should not ordinarily be a reason to consider ter­
mination of pregnancy. Rubella-susceptible 
women who are not vaccinated because of preg­
nancy should be counseled about the importance 
of being vaccinated as soon as they are no longer 
pregnant.9 MMR is the vaccine of choice for rubel­
la, especially when the recipient also is likely to be 
susceptible to measles, mumps, or both (Table 2). 
Work restrictions are necessary for personnel 
who acquire rubella; ill personnel need to be 
excluded from duty for 5 days after the rash 
appears. Likewise, personnel susceptible to rubel­
la require exclusion from duty from the seventh 
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day after the first exposure through the 21st day 
after the last exposure (Table 3). 
16. Scabies and pediculosis 
a. Scabies 
Scabies is caused by infestation with the mite 
Sarcoptes scabiei. The conventional (typical) clini­
cal presentation of scabies includes intense pruri­
tus and cutaneous tracks, where mites have bur­
rowed into the skin. Crusted or “Norwegian” sca­
bies may develop among immunocompromised 
and elderly individuals in which their skin may 
become hyperkeratotic; pruritus may not be pre­
sent, which also makes diagnosis difficult. In con­
ventional scabies, 10 to 15 mites are present, 
whereas in crusted scabies, thousands of mites 
are harbored in the skin, increasing the potential 
for transmission.310,311 
Nosocomial outbreaks of scabies have 
occurred in a variety of health care settings, 
including intensive care units,312 rehabilitation 
centers,313 long-term care facilities,314,315 hospital 
wards,316 a dialysis unit,317 and a health care 
laundry.318 In recent years there has been an 
increase in the occurrence of crusted scabies 
among immunocompromised patients, particu­
larly persons with HIV, which has led to the 
transmission of scabies among personnel, 
patients, and their families.310,312-316,319-321 
Nosocomial transmission of scabies occurs 
primarily through prolonged skin-to-skin con­
tact with an infested person who has conven­
tional scabies.310,322 Shorter periods of skin-to­
skin contact with persons who have crusted sca­
bies may result in transmission of scabies.323 
Personnel have acquired scabies while perform­
ing patient care duties such as sponge bathing, 
lifting, or applying body lotions.310,311,319,324 
Transmission by casual contact, such as by hold­
ing hands, or through inanimate objects, such as 
infested bedding, clothes, or other fomites, has 
been reported infrequently.317,318 
The use of contact precautions when taking 
care of infested patients before application of 
scabicides can decrease the risk of transmission to 
personnel.3,311 Routine cleaning of the environ­
ment of patients with typical scabies, especially 
bed linens and upholstered furniture, will aid in 
eliminating the mites. Additional environmental 
cleaning procedures may be warranted for crust­
ed scabies.310,311,325-327 
Recommendations for treatment and control 
of scabies in health care institutions have been 
published previously.310,311,327-331 The recommend-
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ed topical scabicides include permethrin cream 
(5%), crotamiton (10%), and lindane (1%) lotion; 
resistance to and adverse effects from lindane 
have been reported.329 Single-dose oral iver­
mectin has recently been shown to be an effec­
tive therapy for scabies323,330,332 but has not 
received Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approval for this purpose. 
Most infested health care workers have typical 
scabies with low mite loads333; a single correct 
application of a scabicide is adequate and imme­
diately decreases the risk of transmis­
sion.25,315-317,319,322,324,334 There are no controlled 
evaluations of the efficacy of prophylactic scabi­
cide therapy among health care personnel, and 
some experts recommend two applications of 
scabicide for all infested personnel.311,315,321 If 
personnel continue to have symptoms after ini­
tial treatment, another application of scabicide 
may be needed. Persistent symptoms likely rep­
resent newly hatched mites rather than new 
infestation; however, pruritus after scabies infes­
tation and treatment may persist for as long as 2 
weeks, even without infestation.25 Patients with 
crusted scabies may require repeated treatments 
and should be observed for recurrence of the 
mite infestation.310,311,314,326 Personnel who are 
exposed to scabies but lack signs of infestation 
do not usually require prophylactic treatment 
with scabicides. In outbreak situations where 
transmission continues to occur, prophylaxis 
may be warranted for both patients and exposed 
health care personnel.311, 313 
Restrictions from patient care are indicated for 
personnel infested with scabies until after they 
receive initial treatment and have been medically 
evaluated and determined to be free of infestation. 
They should be advised to report for further eval­
uation if symptoms do not subside. 
b. Pediculosis 
Pediculosis is caused by infestation with any of 
three species of lice: Pediculus humanus capitus 
(human head louse), Pediculus humanus corporis 
(human body louse), and Phthirus pubis (pubic or 
crab louse). 
Head lice are transmitted by head-to-head con­
tact or by contact with infested fomites such as 
hats, combs, or brushes. Nosocomial transmis­
sion, although not common, has occurred.310 
Body lice are usually associated with poor 
hygiene and overcrowded conditions. Trans­
mission occurs by contact with the skin or cloth­
ing of an infested person. Nosocomial transmis­
sion is unlikely. 
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Pubic lice are primarily found in the pubic 
hair but can be found in the axilla, eyelashes, or 
eyebrows. Transmission occurs primarily 
through intimate physical or sexual contact. 
Transmission by fomites, such as toilet seats or 
bedding, is uncommon. Nosocomial transmis­
sion is very unlikely. 
Recommendations for control of pediculosis 
have been published previously.310,327,335 The drugs 
recommended for treatment include permethrin 
cream 1%, pyrethrins with piperonyl butoxide, 
1%.328-330,335malathion 0.5%, and lindane 
Resistance to various drugs has been reported. 
Local health departments may have information 
about drugs that are effective in their areas. 
Health care personnel exposed to patients with 
pediculosis do not require treatment, unless they 
show evidence of infestation. 
Restriction from patient care is indicated for 
personnel with pediculosis until after they receive 
initial treatment and are found to be free of adult 
and immature lice. If symptoms do not subside 
after initial treatment, they should be advised to 
report for further evaluation. 
17. Staphylococcus aureus infection and 
carriage 
Staphylococcal infection and carriage occur fre­
quently in human beings. In hospitals, the most 
important sources of S. aureus are infected and 
colonized patients. Previously, methicillin-suscep­
tible (but penicillin-resistant) S. aureus accounted 
for most staphylococcal infections. In recent 
years, however, methicillin-resistant S. aureus has 
accounted for approximately 80% of all S. aureus 
isolates reported to the National Nosocomial 
Infections Surveillance System.336,337 The epidemi­
ology of methicillin-resistant S. aureus does not 
appear to differ from that of methicillin-suscepti­
ble, penicillin-resistant S. aureus, except that out­
breaks of methicillin-resistant S. aureus tend to 
occur more frequently among elderly or immuno­
compromised patients or among patients with 
severe underlying conditions.338,339 
Nosocomial transmission of S. aureus occurs 
primarily by the hands of personnel, which can 
become contaminated by contact with the colo­
nized or infected body sites of patients.339,340 
Hospital personnel who are infected or colonized 
with S. aureus also can serve as reservoirs and dis­
seminators of S. aureus,341-344 and infected dietary 
personnel have been implicated in staphylococcal 
food poisoning.345 The role of contaminated envi­
ronmental surfaces in transmission of S. aureus 
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has rarely been well documented346 and remains 
controversial, although heavy contamination of 
fomites may facilitate transmission to patients by 
hands of personnel.339 
The incubation period for S. aureus infections 
varies by type of disease. For food-borne illness 
it is 30 minutes to 6 hours, for bullous impetigo 
it is 1 to 10 days, for toxic shock syndrome it is 
usually 2 days, and for other types of infection it 
is variable.347 
Carriage of S. aureus is most common in the 
anterior nares, but other sites, such as the hands, 
axilla, perineum, nasopharynx, and oropharynx, 
may also be involved.339 The frequency of nasal 
carriage of S. aureus among health care personnel 
ranges between 20% and 90%, but fewer than 10% 
of healthy nasal carriers disperse the organisms 
into the air.342 Nasal carriers with upper respirato­
ry symptoms can disseminate the organism more 
effectively.342 Carriage of S. aureus in the nares has 
been shown to correspond to hand carriage,336 
and persons with skin lesions caused by S. aureus 
are more likely than asymptomatic nasal carriers 
to disseminate the organism. 
Culture surveys of personnel can detect carriers 
of S. aureus but do not indicate which carriers are 
likely to disseminate organisms. Thus, such sur­
veys are not cost-effective and may subject per­
sonnel with positive culture results to unneces­
sary treatment and removal from duty. A more 
reasonable approach is to conduct active surveil­
lance for nosocomial S. aureus infections. Culture 
surveys may be indicated if, after a thorough epi­
demiologic investigation, personnel are linked to 
infections. Such implicated personnel can then be 
removed from clinical duties until carriage has 
been eradicated.339,341,348-350 
Several antimicrobial regimens have been used 
successfully to eradicate staphylococcal carriage in 
health care personnel. These regimens include 
orally administered antimicrobial agents (e.g., 
rifampin, clindamycin, or ciprofloxacin) alone or 
in combination with another oral (e.g., trimetho­
prim-sulfamethoxazole) or topical (mupirocin) 
antimicrobial.349,351-363 Resistant S. aureus strains 
have emerged after the use of these oral or topical 
antimicrobial agents for eradication of S. aureus 
colonization.18,210,349,353,364-366 Thus, antimicrobial 
treatment to eradicate carriage may be best if lim­
ited to personnel who are carriers epidemiological­
ly linked to disease transmission. Nosocomial 
transmission of S. aureus can be prevented by 
adherence to standard precautions and other forms 
of transmission-based precautions as needed.3 
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Restriction from patient-care activities or food 
handling is indicated for personnel who have 
draining skin lesions that are infected with S. 
aureus until they have received appropriate thera­
py and the infection has resolved. No work restric­
tions are necessary for personnel who are colo­
nized with S. aureus, unless they have been epi­
demiologically implicated in S. aureus transmis­
sion within the facility. 
18. Streptococcus, group A infection 
Group A Streptococcus (GAS) has been trans­
mitted from infected patients to health care per­
sonnel after contact with infected secretions,367-369 
and the infected personnel have subsequently 
acquired a variety of GAS-related illnesses (e.g., 
toxic shock–like syndrome, cellulitis, lymphangi­
tis, and pharyngitis). Health care personnel who 
were GAS carriers have infrequently been linked 
to sporadic outbreaks of surgical site, postpartum, 
or burn wound infections370-376 and to food-borne 
transmission of GAS causing pharyngitis.377 In 
these outbreaks, GAS carriage was documented in 
the pharynx,369,372,378 the skin,369,370 the rec­
tum,369,375 and the female genital tract of the 
infected personnel.369,374,379 
The incubation period for GAS pharyngitis is 2 to 
5 days, but for impetigo is 7 to 10 days. The incu­
bation period is variable for other GAS infections.380 
Culture surveys to detect GAS carriage among 
personnel are not warranted, unless personnel are 
epidemiologically linked to cases of nosocomial 
infection.378 In instances where thorough epi­
demiologic investigation has implicated person­
nel in nosocomial transmission, cultures may be 
obtained from skin lesions, pharynx, rectum, and 
vagina; GAS isolates obtained from personnel and 
patients can be serotyped to determine strain 
relatedness.373 Treatment of personnel carriers 
needs to be individually determined because (a) 
experience is limited regarding the treatment of 
personnel carriers implicated in GAS outbreaks 
and (b) carriage of the organism by personnel 
may be recurrent through long periods.369-371,374 
Contact is the major mode of transmission of GAS 
in these health care settings. Airborne transmis­
sion during outbreaks has been suggested by sev­
eral investigators, and some have demonstrated 
that exercising and changing of clothing can lead 
to airborne dissemination of GAS from rectal and 
vaginal carriage.369,374,375,379 Nosocomial transmis­
sion of GAS to personnel can be prevented by 
adherence to standard precautions or other trans-
mission-based precautions as needed.3 
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Restriction from patient care activities and food 
handling is indicated for personnel with GAS infec­
tions until 24 hours after they have received appro­
priate therapy. However, no work restrictions are 
necessary for personnel who are colonized with 
GAS, unless they have been epidemiologically linked 
to transmission of infection within the facility. 
19. Tuberculosis 
Nosocomial transmission of tuberculosis (TB) 
is well documented, but such transmission in the 
United States is generally low. However, the risk 
may be increased in health care facilities located 
in communities with (a) high rates of HIV, (b) 
high numbers of persons from TB-endemic coun­
tries, and (c) communities with a high prevalence 
of TB infection.381,382 In some areas in the United 
States, the incidence and prevalence of mul­
tidrug-resistant Mycobacterium tuberculosis 
(MDR-TB) have also increased, and nosocomial 
MDR-TB outbreaks have occurred.383-391 The 
increased risk of occupational acquisition of TB 
by health care personnel has been reported for 
decades, and it dramatically decreased after the 
introduction of effective antituberculous 
drugs.392,393 Skin-test conversion rates among 
health care personnel after routine skin testing 
have ranged from 0.11% to 10%.394 Among health 
care personnel with known exposure to an infec­
tious patient with TB or involved in prolonged 
nosocomial outbreaks of TB, the skin-test conver­
sion rates have ranged from 18% to 55%.383­
385,388,389,393,395-401 Health care personnel with 
severely compromised immune systems, especial­
ly those infected with HIV381,402 and including 
those with malignancies or receiving immuno­
suppressive therapy, are at high risk for develop­
ment of active disease after acquisition of tuber­
culous infection. It has been estimated that per­
sons infected with M. tuberculosis and coinfected 
with HIV have an 8% to 10% risk per year for 
development of active TB, whereas immunocom­
petent persons infected with TB have a 10% life­
time risk for active disease.403 
The transmission of TB in health care facilities 
has been primarily caused by incomplete imple­
mentation of recommended TB infection control 
measures.396 In 1994, the CDC published detailed 
recommendations for the prevention of trans­
mission of TB in health care settings, 
“Guidelines for Preventing the Transmission of 
M. tuberculosis in Health Care Facilities, 
1994.”382 A summary of the recommendations 
pertaining to personnel health follows. 
318 CDC Personnel Health Guideline 
a. Strategies for prevention of transmission of TB 
The risk of transmission of TB to or from per­
sonnel in a health care facility varies according 
to the type and size of the facility, the preva­
lence of TB in the community, the patient pop­
ulation served by the facility, the occupational 
group the person represents, the area of the 
facility where the person works, and the effec­
tiveness of the facility’s TB control program. A 
detailed risk assessment is essential in identify­
ing the nature of TB control measures that are 
appropriate for a particular facility, as well as 
for specific areas and occupational groups 
within a facility.382,404 A risk assessment should 
include the following: (a) review of the commu­
nity TB profile, (b) review of the number of 
patients with TB who were treated in each area 
of the facility, (c) review of the drug-suscepti­
bility patterns of TB isolates from patients 
treated in the facility, (d) an analysis of purified 
protein derivative (PPD) skin-test results of 
health care personnel by work area or occupa­
tional group, (e) an evaluation of infection con­
trol parameters, including isolation policies, 
laboratory diagnostic capabilities, and antitu­
berculous therapy regimens, (f) an observation­
al review of TB infection control practices, and 
(g) evaluation of the function and maintenance 
of environmental controls.382 
Transmission of TB can be minimized by 
developing and implementing an effective TB 
control program that is based on a hierarchy of 
controls: (a) administrative controls, (b) engi­
neering controls, and (c) personal respiratory 
protection.382,384,386,393,396,404,405 
b. TB screening program 
A TB screening program for personnel is an inte­
gral part of a health care facility’s comprehensive 
TB control program. The screening program 
should be based on the facility-specific risk assess­
ment. It may be advisable to screen immunocom­
promised personnel every 6 months.382 
Baseline PPD testing of all personnel (including 
personnel with a history of bacille Calmette-
Guérin [BCG] vaccination) during their preem­
ployment physical examination or their applica­
tion for hospital privileges will identify personnel 
who have been previously infected. For the base­
line testing, a two-step procedure for personnel 
without a PPD test in the past 12 months can be 
used to minimize the likelihood of confusing reac­
tivity from an old infection (boosting) with reac­
tivity from a recent infection (conversion). 
Decisions concerning the use of the two-step pro-
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cedure for baseline testing in a particular facility 
should be based on the frequency of boosting in 
that facility. Criteria used for interpretation of a 
PPD-test reaction may vary depending on (a) the 
purpose (diagnostic or epidemiologic) of the test, 
(b) the prevalence of TB infection in the popula­
tion being tested, (c) the immune status of the 
host, and (d) any previous receipt of BCG immu­
nization. Detailed recommendations for perform­
ing and interpreting skin tests have been pub­
lished.382,406-408 
c. Follow-up evaluation 
The risk assessment will show which health 
care personnel have the potential for exposure to 
M. tuberculosis and determine how frequently 
they should receive PPD testing. At a minimum, 
annual PPD testing is indicated for personnel with 
the potential for exposure to TB. 
It is also important to obtain an initial chest 
radiograph for personnel with positive PPD-test 
reactions, documented PPD-test conversions, or 
pulmonary symptoms suggestive of TB. There 
are no data to support the use of routine chest 
radiographic examinations for asymptomatic 
PPD-negative personnel. In addition, personnel 
who have positive PPD-test reactions but also 
received adequate preventive treatment do not 
need repeat chest films, unless they have pul­
monary symptoms suggestive of TB. Repeat 
chest radiographic examinations of such persons 
have not been shown to be beneficial or cost-
effective in monitoring persons for development 
of disease. However, more frequent monitoring 
for symptoms of TB may be considered for per­
sonnel who had recent conversion of their PPD 
test and those persons who, if infected, are at 
increased risk for development of active TB (e.g., 
HIV-infected or otherwise severely immunocom­
promised persons).382 Routine anergy testing of 
HIV-seropositive individuals is limited in its use­
fulness; however, anergy testing may be useful in 
guiding individual decisions regarding preven­
tive therapy in selected situations.408 
d. Management of personnel after exposure to TB 
It is important to administer PPD tests to per­
sonnel as soon as possible after TB exposures are 
recognized. Such immediate PPD testing estab­
lishes a baseline with which subsequent PPD 
tests can be compared. A PPD test performed 12 
weeks after the last exposure will indicate 
whether infection has occurred. Persons already 
known to have reactive PPD tests need not be 
retested. Personnel with evidence of new infec­
tion (i.e., PPD-test conversions) need to be evalu­
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ated for active TB. If active TB is not diagnosed, 
preventive therapy should be considered.382 
e. Preventive therapy 
For workers with positive PPD-test results who 
were probably exposed to drug-susceptible TB, 
preventive therapy with isoniazid is indicated, 
unless there are contraindications to such thera­
py.382,407 Alternative preventive regimens have been 
proposed for persons who have positive PPD-test 
results after exposure to drug-resistant TB.409 
f. Work restrictions 
Personnel with active pulmonary or laryngeal TB 
may be highly infectious; exclusion from duty is 
indicated until they are noninfectious. If personnel 
are excluded from duty because of active TB, the 
facility should have documentation from their 
health care providers that personnel are noninfec­
tious before they are allowed to return to duty. The 
documentation needs to include evidence that (a) 
adequate therapy is being received, (b) the cough 
has resolved, and (c) results of three consecutive 
sputum acid-fast bacilli (AFB) smears collected on 
different days are negative. After personnel resume 
duty and while they remain on anti-TB therapy, 
periodic documentation from their health care 
providers is needed to show that effective drug 
therapy is being maintained for the recommended 
period and that their sputum AFB smear results 
continue to be negative. If personnel discontinue 
their treatment, they need to be evaluated for active 
TB; directly observed therapy may be considered. 
Work restrictions are not necessary for person­
nel receiving preventive treatment for latent TB 
(positive PPD-test result without active disease) or 
for personnel with latent TB who do not accept 
preventive therapy. However, these personnel 
should be instructed to seek evaluation promptly 
if symptoms suggestive of TB develop. 
g. Considerations for BCG vaccine 
BCG has not been routinely used in the United 
States to protect health care personnel. Never­
theless, because of the resurgence of TB in the 
United States and new information about the pro­
tective effect of BCG,410,411 the role of BCG vaccina­
tion in the prevention and control of TB in the coun­
try has been reevaluated.412 The following is a sum­
mary of the joint statement by the Advisory Council 
for the Elimination of Tuberculosis and ACIP 
regarding the use of BCG in health care personnel. 
Two recent metaanalyses of 18410 and 26411 BCG 
studies, respectively, indicate that the efficacy of 
BCG vaccine in preventing serious TB is high 
(>80%) in children and suggest 50% efficacy in 
adults. However, the protective efficacy of the vac-
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cine in adolescents and adults, including health 
care personnel and HIV-infected children and 
adults, has not been determined.412 
BCG vaccination should not be used as a pri­
mary TB control strategy because (a) the protec­
tive efficacy of the vaccine in health care person­
nel is uncertain and (b) even if vaccination is 
effective in an individual, other persons in the 
health care facility are not protected against pos­
sible exposure to and infection with drug-resistant 
strains of M. tuberculosis. However, BCG vaccina­
tion may be indicated for health care personnel in 
a few geographic areas where the prevalence of 
MDR-TB is high, transmission of TB is likely, and 
TB infection control measures have been imple­
mented but have not been successful in control­
ling nosocomial transmission.412 Consultation 
with local and state health departments is advis­
able when determining whether to provide BCG 
vaccination to health care personnel. 
BCG vaccination often results in local adverse 
effects (such as muscular soreness, erythema, 
purulent drainage, and axillary or cervical lym­
phadenopathy) for as long as 3 months after vacci­
nation; serious long-term complications (such as 
musculoskeletal lesions, multiple lymphadenitis, 
and disseminated BCG disease) are infrequent.413-415 
The safety of BCG vaccination in immunocompro­
mised populations (i.e., immunocompromised 
from immune deficiency diseases, HIV infection, 
leukemia, lymphoma, or generalized malignancy, 
or immunosuppressed as a result of therapy with 
corticosteroids, alkylating drugs, antimetabolites, 
or radiation) has not been determined by adequate 
epidemiologic studies. However, because of the 
possibility of disseminated BCG infection in such 
persons,416-419 BCG vaccination is not recommend­
ed for immunocompromised personnel.412 The 
safety of BCG vaccination in pregnant women has 
also not been evaluated; therefore, it is not recom­
mended for pregnant personnel.412 
PPD testing is not contraindicated for persons 
who have received BCG vaccine and can be used 
to support or exclude the diagnosis of infection 
with M. tuberculosis.412 PPD-test reactivity caused 
by BCG vaccination wanes with time420-422 and is 
unlikely to persist longer than 10 years after vac­
cination in the absence of infection with M. tuber­
culosis.420,421 After a person has been vaccinated 
with BCG, the presence or size of a PPD-test reac­
tion cannot be used to predict whether BCG will 
provide any protection against TB disease423,424 or 
to determine whether the reaction is caused by 
M. tuberculosis infection or the previous BCG 
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vaccination.425 However, a BCG-vaccinated per­
son who has a PPD-test reaction of ≥ 10 mm 
induration should be considered infected with 
TB, especially if the vaccinee (a) is a contact of a 
person with infectious TB, particularly if the 
infectious person has transmitted M. tuberculosis 
to others, (b) is from a country with high preva­
lence of TB, or (c) is continually exposed to pop­
ulations in which the prevalence of TB is high.412 
20. Vaccinia (smallpox) 
Through aggressive surveillance for smallpox 
combined with the effective use of smallpox vac­
cine (vaccinia virus vaccine), the World Health 
Organization was able to declare the world free of 
smallpox in 1980. The smallpox vaccine licensed 
for use in the United States is derived from infec­
tious vaccinia virus. After vaccination, the virus 
can be cultured from the vaccination site until the 
scab has separated from the skin (2 to 21 days 
after vaccination); thus, susceptible persons may 
acquire vaccinia from a recently vaccinated per­
son.426-429 Covering the vaccination site and wash­
ing hands after contact with the vaccination site 
(including bandages) will prevent transmission. 
Recently, recombinant vaccinia viruses have been 
engineered to express immunizing agents of sev­
eral viruses (e.g., herpesvirus, HBV, influenza). 
There is a theoretic risk that transmission could 
occur from contact with contaminated dressings 
or by contact with recombinant vaccine, but no 
such transmission has been reported among per­
sonnel who provide care to recipients of the 
recombinant vaccine. Infections also have been 
reported among laboratory personnel who handle 
viral cultures or materials contaminated with vac­
cinia or recombinant viruses.18,162 
Smallpox vaccination (every 10 years) is indicat­
ed for personnel who work directly with orthopox 
viruses (e.g., monkeypox, vaccinia, variola) or in 
animal care areas where orthopox viruses are stud­
ied. In selected instances, vaccination may be con­
sidered for personnel who provide care to recipients 
of recombinant vaccinia vaccine.9,18 Personnel who 
receive the vaccine may continue to have contact 
with patients if the vaccination site is covered and 
handwashing is strictly observed.18 Vaccine is not 
recommended for personnel with immunosuppres­
sion or eczema or for personnel who are pregnant. 
21. Varicella 
Nosocomial transmission of varicella-zoster virus 
(VZV) is well recognized.430-441 Sources for nosoco­
mial exposures have included patients, health care 
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personnel, and visitors (including the children of 
personnel) with either varicella or herpes zoster. 
All susceptible adults in health care settings are 
at risk for varicella and its complications. During 
1990 through 1994, fewer than 5% of varicella 
cases occurred among adults older than 20 years, 
but they accounted for 55% of varicella-related 
deaths. Certain persons are at higher risk for 
severe disease and secondary complications: preg­
nant women, premature infants born to varicella-
susceptible mothers, infants born at less than 28 
weeks’ gestation or weighing ≤ 1000 gm (regard­
less of maternal immune status), and immuno­
compromised patients.13 
The incubation period for varicella is usually 14 
to 16 days but may be from 10 to 21 days after 
exposure, although the incubation period may be 
shorter in immunocompromised persons.442 In 
persons who receive postexposure VZV immune 
globulin, the incubation period may be as long as 
28 days after exposure. Transmission of infection 
may occur from 2 days before onset of rash and 
usually as long as 5 days after rash onset.442 
VZV is transmitted by the contact with infect­
ed lesions and, in hospitals, airborne transmis­
sion has occurred from patients with varicella or 
zoster to susceptible persons who had no direct 
contact with the infected patient.443-447 Adher­
ence to airborne and contact precautions when 
caring for patients with known or suspected 
VZV infection can reduce the risk of transmis­
sion to personnel.3 
It is generally advisable to allow only personnel 
who are immune to varicella to take care of 
patients with VZV. Because of the possibility of 
transmission to and development of severe illness 
in high-risk patients, personnel with localized 
zoster should not take care of such patients until 
all lesions are dry and crusted.13,447 Personnel with 
localized zoster are not likely to transmit infection 
to immunocompetent patients if their lesions can 
be covered. However, some institutions may 
exclude personnel with zoster from work until 
their lesions dry and crust.439 
a. Varicella screening and vaccination 
Serologic tests have been used to assess the 
accuracy of reported histories of chicken­
pox.440,448-450 In adults, a history of varicella is 
highly predictive of serologic immunity (97% 
to 99% seropositive). Most adults who have 
negative or uncertain histories of varicella are 
also seropositive (71% to 93%). In health care 
institutions, serologic screening of personnel 
who have negative or uncertain histories is 
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likely to be cost-effective, depending on the rel­
ative costs of the test and vaccine.9,13 
A variety of methods have been used for detect­
ing varicella antibody, but a commercially avail­
able latex agglutination test provides prompt, sen­
sitive, and specific serologic results at a reason­
able cost. The latex agglutination test may not 
detect low levels of protective antibody that can 
occur after vaccination; however, a test with 
increased sensitivity and specificity is currently 
under development. Routine testing for varicella 
immunity after vaccination is not necessary, 
because 99% of persons are seropositive after the 
second dose. Moreover, seroconversion does not 
always result in full protection against disease. 
However, testing vaccinees after exposures may be 
warranted. In addition, vaccinated persons who 
are exposed to varicella but lack antibody may be 
retested in 5 to 6 days to determine whether they 
are antibody seropositive after the second test and 
therefore unlikely to acquire varicella.13 
In March 1995, a live-attenuated varicella vac­
cine was licensed for use in the United States. 
Administration of varicella vaccine is recom­
mended for all susceptible health care person­
nel, especially those who will have close contact 
with persons at high risk for serious complica­
tions.9,13,451,452 Effective varicella vaccination pro­
grams require two doses of vaccine to achieve 
high seroconversion rates in adults;451 the need 
for and response to booster doses of vaccine are 
unknown. Vaccination provides approximately 
70% protection against infection and 95% pro­
tection against severe disease in follow-up from 
7 to 10 years after vaccination.13 Cases of vari­
cella have occurred among vaccinees after expo­
sure to wild-type virus (“breakthrough infec­
tion”). Data from vaccine trials in which vacci­
nees of all ages were followed up for as long as 
9 years indicate that 1% to 4% of vaccine recip­
ients per year acquire varicella, depending on 
the vaccine lot and interval after vaccination.9,13 
However, vaccinated persons have milder dis­
ease (e.g., afebrile, a mean of 50 skin lesions 
that are often not vesicular, and shorter duration 
of illness) than do unvaccinated individuals 
(e.g., febrile with several hundred vesicular 
lesions)453,454 and are less likely to transmit dis­
ease than unvaccinated persons. 
The rate of transmission of disease from vac­
cinees who contract varicella is low for vacci­
nated children but has not been studied in 
adults. Active surveillance for 1 to 8 years after 
vaccination of 2141 children between 1981 and 
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1989 in 10 different trials9 resulted in reports of 
breakthrough infections in 78 children, which 
further resulted in secondary cases in 12.2% 
(11/90) of vaccinated siblings. Illness was mild 
in both index and secondary cases. There also 
has been a report of transmission from a vacci­
nated child in whom breakthrough disease 
occurred to a susceptible mother.9 
All information currently available on vaccine 
efficacy and the persistence of antibody in vac­
cinees is based on research conducted in set­
tings where infection is highly prevalent and not 
affected by the wide use of vaccine. Thus, the 
extent to which the protection provided by vac­
cination has been increased by boosting from 
exposure to natural virus and whether longer 
term immunity may wane as the prevalence of 
natural VZV decreases are unknown. 
b. Transmission of vaccine virus 
In clinical trials, 3.8% of children and 5.5% of 
adolescents and adults acquired a nonlocalized 
rash (median five lesions) after the first injection, 
and 0.9% of adolescents and adults acquired a 
nonlocalized rash after the second injection. 
Available data suggest that healthy children have 
limited potential to transmit vaccine virus to sus­
ceptible contacts (estimated to be <1%) but that 
the risk of transmission from immunocompro­
mised vaccinees is higher.13,455,456 Tertiary trans­
mission of vaccine virus to a second healthy sib­
ling of a vaccinated leukemic child has also 
occurred.456 These data suggest that healthy, vac­
cinated individuals have a very small risk of trans­
mitting vaccine virus to their contacts; this risk 
may be higher in those who acquire a varicella-
like rash after vaccination. 
Although the risk of transmission of vaccine 
virus from vaccinees is not known, the risk if any 
appears to be very low, and the benefits of vacci­
nating susceptible health care personnel clearly 
outweigh this potential risk. As a safeguard, insti­
tutions may wish to consider precautions for vac­
cinated personnel who acquire a rash or who will 
have contact with susceptible persons at high risk 
for serious complications. 
c. Management of health care personnel exposed 
to varicella 
When unvaccinated susceptible personnel are 
exposed to varicella, they are potentially infec­
tious 10 to 21 days after exposure, and exclusion 
from duty is indicated from the tenth day after the 
first exposure through the 21st day after the last 
exposure, or until all lesions are dry and crusted if 
varicella occurs (Table 3).256 
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Table 6. Pregnant health care personnel: Pertinent facts to guide management of occupational exposures to infectious agents 
Potential effect Rate of perinatal
 
Agent on fetus transmission Maternal Screening Prevention
 
1. Cytomegalo- Hearing loss; congenital 15% after primary mater- Antibody provides some Standard precautions 
virus syndrome* nal infection; sympto­ but not complete protec­
matic 5% tion against clinical dis­
ease; routine screening 
not recommended 
2. Hepatitis B Hepatitis; development of HBeAg seropositive 90%; HBsAg routine screening Vaccine and HBIG to 
chronic infection in infant HBeAg negative 0-25% recommended infant; standard pre­
cautions 
3. Hepatitis C Hepatitis 2%-5% Anti-HCV; HCV RNA in ref- Standard precautions 
erence labs; routine 
screening not recom­
mended 
4. Herpes Mucocutaneous lesions, Unlikely from nosocomial Antibody testing not use- Standard precautions 
simplex sepsis, encephalitis; con- exposure; primary 33%­ ful; inspection for lesions 
genital malformations (rare) 50%, recurrent 4% at delivery 
5. Human im- AIDS by 2-3 yr 8%-30% Antibody by enzyme Avoid high-risk behaviors; 
munodefici­ immunoassay, Western consider postexposure 
ency virus blot prophylaxis after high-
risk needlestick expo­
sure; intrapartum and 
postnatal zidovudine for 
HIV-seropositive moth­
ers and their babies; 
standard precautions 
6. Influenza Inconsistent Rare None Vaccine (safe during 
pregnancy); droplet pre­
cautions 
7. Measles Prematurity; abortion Rare History, antibody Vaccine†; airborne pre­
cautions 
8. Parvovirus Hydrops, stillbirth Rare, 3%-9% maximum IgM and IgG antibody Droplet precautions 
B19 adverse outcome prepregnancy; antibody 
protective 
9. Rubella Congenital syndrome* 45%-50% overall; 90% in Antibody Vaccine†; droplet precau­
1st 12 wk tions for acute infection; 
contact precautions for 
congenital rubella 
10. Tuberculosis Hepatomegaly, pulmonary, Rare Skin test Isoniazid ± ethambutol 
CNS for disease; airborne 
precautions 
11. Varicella- Malformations (skin, limb, Total 25%; congenital syn- Antibody Vaccine†; VZIG within 96 
zoster CNS, eye); chickenpox drome (0-4%) hours of exposure if sus­
ceptible; airborne and 
contact precautions 
Modified from Siegel JD. Risk and exposure for the pregnant health-care worker. In: Olmstead RN, editor. APIC infection control and applied epidemiology:
 
principles and practices. St Louis: Mosby; 1996. p. 22-2-22-3 (table 22-1). HBeAg, Hepatitis B e antigen; CNS, central nervous system.
 
*Congenital syndrome: varying combinations of jaundice, hepatosplenomegaly, microcephaly, CNS abnormalities, thrombocytopenia, anemia, retinopathy,
 
and skin and bone lesions.
 
†Live-virus vaccines are given routinely before pregnancy. 
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If vaccinated health care personnel are exposed 
to varicella, they may be serotested immediately 
after exposure to assess the presence of anti­
body.452 If they are seronegative, they may be 
excluded from duty or monitored daily for devel­
opment of symptoms. Exclusion from duty is indi­
cated if symptoms (fever, upper respiratory tract 
symptoms, or rash) develop. 
Vaccination should be considered for exposed 
unvaccinated health care personnel without docu­
mented immunity.441,452 Because the efficacy of post-
exposure vaccination is unknown, however, persons 
vaccinated after an exposure should be managed as 
previously recommended for unvaccinated persons. 
The routine postexposure use of VZV immune 
globulin (VZIG) is not recommended among 
immunocompetent health care personnel.13 VZIG 
can be costly, does not necessarily prevent varicel­
la, and may prolong the incubation period by a 
week or more, thus extending the time that per­
sonnel will be restricted from duty. The use of 
VZIG may be considered for immunocompro­
mised (e.g., HIV infected) or pregnant health care 
personnel.13,457 Postexposure use of acyclovir may 
be effective and less costly than the use of VZIG in 
some susceptible persons.457 However, additional 
data concerning the efficacy of acyclovir for post-
exposure prophylaxis are needed before such use 
can be recommended.9,13,441,458 
22. Viral respiratory infections 
Viral respiratory infections are common prob­
lems in health care settings. Nosocomial respira­
tory infections can be caused by a number of 
viruses, including adenoviruses, influenza virus, 
parainfluenza viruses, respiratory syncytial virus 
(RSV), and rhinoviruses. Because influenza and 
RSV substantially contribute to the morbidity and 
mortality associated with viral pneumonia and 
both have been well studied epidemiologically, 
this section focuses on prevention of these two 
viral infections among personnel. Additional 
information on influenza and RSV can be found 
in the “Guideline for Prevention of Nosocomial 
Pneumonia.” 459 
a. Influenza 
Nosocomial transmission of influenza has 
been reported in acute and long-term care facil­
ities.460-465 Transmission has occurred from 
patients to health care personnel,462,464 from 
health care personnel to patients,466 and among 
health care personnel.465,467-472 
Influenza is believed to be transmitted from 
person to person by direct deposition of virus-
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laden large droplets onto the mucosal surfaces of 
the upper respiratory tract of an individual during 
close contact with an infected person, as well as 
by droplet nuclei or small-particle aerosols.21,290,473 
Although the extent of transmission by virus-con­
taminated hands or fomites is not known, it is not 
the primary mode of transmission.473 
The incubation period of influenza is usually 1 
to 5 days, and the period of greatest communica­
bility is during the first 3 days of illness. 
However, virus can be shed before the onset of 
symptoms and as long as 7 days after illness 
onset.474-476 Persons at greatest risk for influenza-
related complications include (a) persons older 
than 65 years, (b) residents of nursing homes 
and other chronic care facilities, (c) persons with 
chronic pulmonary or cardiovascular conditions, 
and (d) persons with diabetes mellitus.17 
Adherence to droplet precautions may prevent 
nosocomial transmission.3 
Administration of influenza vaccine to health 
care personnel, including pregnant women,9 
before the beginning of each influenza season can 
help to (a) reduce the risk to health care personnel 
of influenza infection, (b) prevent transmission of 
influenza from personnel to persons at high risk 
for complications, and (c) reduce personnel 
absenteeism during community outbreaks. 
Innovative methods may be needed to increase 
influenza immunization rates among health care 
personnel.477 Immunization rates may also be 
increased by providing data to health care person­
nel on the low rates of systemic reactions to 
influenza vaccine among healthy adults.478 
During institutional outbreaks of influenza, 
prophylactic antiviral agents (e.g., amantadine 
and rimantadine) may be used in conjunction 
with influenza vaccine to reduce the severity 
and duration of illness among unvaccinated 
health care personnel. Amantadine and rimanta­
dine may be administered for 2 weeks after per­
sonnel vaccination or, in unvaccinated person­
nel, for the duration of influenza activity in the 
community.17,459,465,479 
b. Respiratory syncytial virus 
Nosocomial transmission of respiratory syncy­
tial virus (RSV) is greatest during the early winter 
when community RSV outbreaks occur; patients, 
visitors, and health care personnel may transmit 
the virus in the health care setting. RSV infection 
is most common among infants and children, who 
are likely to acquire more severe disease. Because 
RSV infection can also occur simultaneously with 
other respiratory viruses, it may go unrecog­
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nized.480,481 Nosocomial transmission has been 
reported most frequently among newborn and 
pediatric patients,482,483 but outbreaks associated 
with substantial morbidity and mortality have 
been reported among adults in bone-marrow 
transplant centers,484 intensive care units,485 and 
long-term care facilities.486,487 
RSV is present in large numbers in the respira­
tory secretions of persons symptomatically infect­
ed with the virus and can be transmitted directly 
through large droplets during close contact with 
such persons or indirectly by hands or fomites 
that are contaminated with RSV. Hands can 
become contaminated through handling of infect­
ed persons’ respiratory secretions or contaminat­
ed fomites and can transmit RSV by touching the 
eyes or nose.459 The incubation period ranges 
from 2 to 8 days; 4 to 6 days is most common. In 
general, infected persons shed the virus for 3 to 8 
days, but young infants may shed virus for as long 
as 3 to 4 weeks. Adherence to contact precautions 
effectively prevents nosocomial transmission. 
c. Work restrictions 
Because large numbers of personnel may have 
viral respiratory illnesses during the winter, it 
may not be possible to restrict infected personnel 
from all patient care duties. Nevertheless, it may 
be prudent to restrict personnel with acute viral 
respiratory infections from the care of high-risk 
patients during community outbreaks of RSV 
and influenza.488 
F. PREGNANT PERSONNEL 
Immunologic changes occur during pregnancy, 
primarily depression of certain aspects of cell-medi­
ated immunity such as decreased levels of helper T 
cells. These changes permit fetal development with­
out rejection but generally do not increase maternal 
susceptibility to infectious diseases. Occupational 
acquisition of infections is of special concern to 
female health care personnel of childbearing age for 
several reasons. Some infections, such as varicella, 
may be more severe during pregnancy. 
Transplacental infections with viruses such as par­
vovirus, varicella, and rubella have been associated 
with abortion, congenital anomaly, and mental 
retardation. Other diseases in which the infectious 
agent may be transmitted to the fetus include CMV, 
hepatitis B, herpes simplex, influenza, and measles. 
In addition, certain drugs used to treat or prevent 
some infections, for example tuberculosis, may be 
contraindicated during pregnancy. 
In general, pregnant health care personnel do 
not have an increased risk for acquiring infections 
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in the workplace. The risks to pregnant personnel 
and methods for prevention are discussed in the 
various sections of this document and are sum­
marized in Table 6. Female personnel of child­
bearing age should be strongly encouraged to 
receive immunizations for vaccine-preventable 
diseases before pregnancy. Such personnel may 
also decrease their risk of acquiring infection by 
adhering to appropriate infection control prac­
tices, including standard precautions when caring 
for all patients. Additional information on occu­
pational risks for pregnant health care personnel 
has been published elsewhere.489-491 
G. LABORATORY PERSONNEL 
Despite the availability of improved engineering 
controls, work practices, and personal protective 
equipment, laboratory personnel remain at risk 
for occupational acquisition of infectious 
agents.5,18,53,151,162,241,492,493 Furthermore, newer 
technologies that require the use of large or con­
centrated specimens may further increase the risk 
of occupationally acquired infections among lab­
oratory personnel.494 
In a review of laboratory-acquired infections 
from 1950 through 1974, more than 4000 labora­
tory-associated infections were documented in 
the United States492; the 10 most commonly 
reported infections were brucellosis, Q fever, 
hepatitis (especially hepatitis B), typhoid fever, 
tularemia, tuberculosis, dermatomycosis, vene­
zuelan equine encephalitis, psittacosis, and coc­
cidioidomycosis. However, laboratory-associated 
infections also have been caused by a wide vari­
ety of other pathogens.162,492,493 More recently, 
viral agents have accounted for a larger propor­
tion of laboratory-associated infections than 
have bacterial agents.493-498 
Laboratory personnel may acquire infection by 
aerosolization of specimens, mouth pipetting, or 
percutaneous injury. Information on the risks of 
laboratory-associated infections and appropriate 
biosafety procedures and precautions for labora­
tories have been published.5, 6, 494, 499, 500 
In addition to biosafety precautions, preventive 
measures (e.g., immunizations and postexposure 
prophylaxis) may also be indicated for laboratory 
personnel who handle infectious agents. In this 
document, disease-specific information and guid­
ance are provided for prevention of laboratory-
associated infections and for management of labo­
ratory personnel exposed to infectious agents. 
Health care institutions need to ensure that labo­
ratory personnel who may be exposed to infectious 
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agents are well informed about the risks of acquir­
ing infections and about biosafety procedures to 
prevent transmission of infectious agents. 
H. EMERGENCY-RESPONSE PERSONNEL 
Emergency medical technicians, firefighters, 
policemen, and others who attend to and trans­
port patients to the hospital may be exposed to 
recognized or undiagnosed transmissible infec­
tious diseases in the patients with whom they 
come in contact. Subtitle B (42 USC 300ff-80) of 
the 1990 Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS 
Resources Emergency Act requires the establish­
ment of notification systems in each state to 
ensure that emergency-response employees 
(including emergency medical technicians, fire­
fighters, and the like) are informed when they 
have been exposed to an emergency medical 
patient with an infectious, potentially fatal disease 
such as HIV or meningococcemia. CDC published 
a list of diseases for which emergency-response 
employees must be informed of an exposure.501 
I. LATEX HYPERSENSITIVITY 
Since the introduction of universal precautions, 
the use of latex gloves has become commonplace 
in health care settings.31,502 The increased use of 
latex gloves has been accompanied by increasing 
reports of allergic reactions to natural rubber 
latex among health care personnel.503-508 
Natural rubber latex is a combination of heat-
and water-soluble proteins derived from the tree 
Hevea braziliensis. Reactions to latex gloves may 
be localized or systemic and include dermatitis, 
conjunctivitis, rhinitis, urticaria, angioedema, 
asthma, and anaphylaxis.509-512 Most local reac­
tions associated with latex glove use are not 
immunologically mediated and result from chem­
icals (e.g., thiurams, carbamates, mercaptoben­
zothiazole, phenylenediamine), accelerants or 
antioxidants added to gloves during manufactur­
ing.502, 507, 513-515 It may be clinically difficult to dif­
ferentiate irritant reactions from allergic contact 
dermatitis reactions; both may be manifested by 
itching, dryness, erythema, bleeding, or scaling of 
the hands. Nevertheless, neither of the types of 
local reactions to latex gloves are good predictors 
of latex allergy503, 516; only a subset of health care 
personnel reporting glove-associated skin irrita­
tion will have immunoglobulin E (IgE) antibod­
ies specific for latex.513, 517-519 
In contrast, systemic reactions to natural rub­
ber latex, including urticaria, are mediated by 
antilatex IgE antibodies509,520,521 and may result 
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from direct skin contact or from exposure to air­
borne latex allergen adsorbed to glove powder. 
Occupational asthma from latex is becoming 
increasingly recognized.520,522-524 Asthmatic 
responses to latex may occur early (<8 hours) or 
late (>8 hours) after exposure.525-527 
Local reactions (i.e., irritant or allergic contact 
dermatitis) to latex gloves account for most 
reported reactions among health care person­
nel.503,506 The risk of progression from localized to 
systemic reactions is unknown. 
Latex gloves may vary considerably in total 
protein content from brand to brand and from 
lot to lot within brands.528,529 However, the total 
protein concentrations and allergenicity of latex 
gloves are not always directly correlated,528 sug­
gesting that total protein concentrations are not 
necessarily a measure of the allergenic proper­
ties of latex gloves. Currently, the amount of 
latex allergen exposure required to produce sen­
sitization or to elicit reactions in previously sen­
sitized persons is unknown. The FDA has man­
dated labeling of all medical devices that contain 
natural rubber latex.530 
Another recognized contributor to latex sensiti­
zation and reactions is the powder or cornstarch 
used as a lubricant for gloves. Levels of 
extractable protein and allergen in a given glove 
have been shown to be correlated with the pres­
ence of powder. Also, investigators have demon­
strated that latex proteins adhere to the powder 
on gloves and that aerosolized latex protein-pow­
der particles can provoke allergic respiratory 
symptoms if inhaled by a latex-sensitive individ­
ual531; similar adherence has not been detected 
with powdered vinyl gloves. In one study, person­
nel wearing powdered latex gloves had a signifi­
cantly higher rate of reaction than did workers 
who wore washed latex gloves, from which the 
powder had been removed (60% vs 28%); none of 
these workers had positive skin-test reactions to 
industrial or commercial cornstarch or powder.504 
Although many health care personnel or clini­
cians may implicate the powder or cornstarch on 
gloves as the cause of their reactions, documented 
reactions to cornstarch powder are rare. 
a. Prevalence and risk factors 
In studies of health care personnel, the reported 
prevalence of IgE-mediated allergy to latex varies 
considerably, ranging from 2.9% to 17%. The 
broad range of prevalence rates reported likely 
represent differences in the personnel groups 
studied and the methods used for estimating sen­
sitization or allergy.518,519,522,532,533 The prevalence 
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detected in some studies also has been biased by 
enrollment or testing of only personnel with 
symptoms.504,508 However, it is estimated that a 
minority of health care personnel seek medical 
evaluation or treatment for latex-allergic condi­
tions, even if they have symptoms. Thus, the true 
prevalence of these reactions among health care 
personnel is unknown. 
The prevalence of sensitization to latex among 
health care personnel has been shown to vary by 
job category and by location within a facility.506,533 
In one study of 224 health care personnel, the 
overall prevalence of skin-prick reactivity to latex 
was 17% but ranged from 0% (0/17) among house­
keepers and clerical workers to 38% (5/13) among 
dental residents and assistants.506 In another sur­
vey of 512 health care personnel, the prevalence 
among physicians (6.5%, 7/108) was greater than 
that among nurses (2.2%, 7/325) or other hospital 
personnel (1.3%, 1/79). Also, operating room per­
sonnel (6.2%, 9/145) were significantly more like­
ly to be sensitized than were personnel assigned to 
general wards or laboratories (1.6%, 6/367); oper­
ating room nurses had fourfold the prevalence of 
general ward nurses (5.6% vs 1.2%).533 
Measurable levels of latex aeroallergen have been 
detected in the breathing zones of operating room 
personnel and may vary as much as 100-fold, 
depending on the invasiveness of the procedure 
and frequency of glove changes.534 
Several factors have been linked with latex sen­
sitization among health care personnel, including 
the presence of other allergic conditions (e.g., 
asthma, eczema, hay fever),503,516,518,519,522,532,533 
nonwhite ethnicity,519,532 elevated total IgE lev­
els,519 allergy to cosmetic powders or foods,535 
years or status (full-time vs part-time) of employ­
ment, and frequency or duration of glove 
use.503,516,522,533 Coexistent allergy to certain fruits 
(e.g., bananas,536,537 avocados,538,539 and chest­
nuts540) also has been described in latex-allergic 
health care personnel. 
Skin irritation and eczematous dermatitis516,533 
(conditions that may allow passage of latex pro­
teins through the skin) and use of other latex 
products (e.g., condoms, diaphragms) have not 
been consistently linked to latex sensitization in 
health care personnel. 
b. Diagnosis and identification 
Diagnosis of latex allergy in personnel relies 
largely on a clinical history of symptoms elicited 
by exposure to latex products (e.g., balloons, 
gloves). Clinical symptoms, such as urticaria, may 
be good predictors of IgE-medicated allergy.516,519 
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A variety of methods have been used to aid in 
the identification of latex-allergic persons; most 
are experimental and have not been approved for 
clinical use. Skin-prick testing may be the most 
sensitive method for diagnosis of IgE-mediated 
allergy, but no standardized FDA-approved anti­
gen is currently available in the United States for 
detection of latex-specific IgE antibodies. 
Moreover, the use of some skin-test reagents in 
highly sensitized persons has been associated 
with adverse outcomes,541 suggesting that these 
nonstandardized reagents may not be safe for rou­
tine use. In Europe, where a standardized testing 
antigen has been developed, skin-prick testing has 
been used successfully. 
FDA-approved immunoassays are available for 
detection of latex-specific IgE antibodies in blood. 
The FDA has recommended that these assays be 
used as confirmatory tests, rather than screening 
tests, for persons in whom latex allergy is sus­
pected on the basis of clinical history and find­
ings. Levels of detectable antibody appear to be 
associated with symptoms,504,519 but, as with other 
allergens, the correlation between serum concen­
trations of latex-specific IgE antibodies and symp­
tom severity may not be predictable.312,504,516 
c. Prevention strategies 
Avoiding latex products remains the cornerstone 
of preventing sensitization (primary prevention) 
and reactions (secondary prevention) to natural 
rubber latex products. Proposed strategies to 
reduce the risk of reactions to natural rubber latex 
have included the use of the following: (a) nonla­
tex (e.g., vinyl) products alone or in combination 
with latex gloves, (b) powder-free latex gloves, (c) 
powdered latex gloves washed to remove powder, 
and (d) “low-protein” latex gloves. However, none 
of these interventions has been prospectively stud­
ied in controlled trials to assess cost-effectiveness 
or efficacy in preventing sensitization or reactions. 
Because latex proteins can be aerosolized when 
powdered gloves are donned or removed, systemic 
symptoms caused by latex aeroallergens may not 
be alleviated by simply avoiding latex products, 
particularly if coworkers of the affected worker 
continue to use powdered latex gloves. Although 
the risk of a worker’s exposure is greatest when 
gloves are donned or removed, allergenic proteins 
also may settle on environmental surfaces, surgi­
cal gowns, or other clothing and become resus­
pended. The use of powder-free or low-protein 
gloves appears more effective and less costly than 
either laminar-flow or high-efficiency particulate 
air-filtered glove-changing stations in reducing 
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latex aeroallergens.534 For personnel with sys­
temic manifestations of latex allergy, workplace 
restriction or reassignment may be necessary. 
J. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
The Americans With Disabilities Act provides 
guidelines for hiring and placing employees 
with disabilities, as defined in the Act.542-545 In 
general, employers must assess applicants for 
their qualifications to perform the tasks inher­
ent to the job for which the employee is being 
considered. Applicants may be asked about their 
ability to perform specific job functions but may 
not be asked about the existence, nature, or 
severity of a disability. Employers must make a 
“reasonable accommodation” to allow an indi­
vidual to perform the essential functions of a 
job, unless the employer can prove that this 
would create undue hardship because of signifi­
cant difficulty or expense. 
The provisions of the Americans With 
Disabilities Act need to be incorporated into infec-
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tion control policies for health care personnel. For 
example, applicants with a communicable disease 
spread by aerosol could justifiably be denied 
employment (until they are no longer infectious) 
because they could pose a direct threat to others. 
On the other hand, applicants who are immuno­
compromised may not necessarily be excluded 
because of an increased risk for acquiring an 
infection in the hospital if the employer can make 
reasonable accommodations that prevent expo­
sure. Health care personnel who are known to be 
immunocompromised need to be referred to per­
sonnel health professionals who can individually 
counsel the employees on their risk for infection. 
At the request of the immunocompromised health 
care personnel, employers should offer but not 
compel a work setting in which health care per­
sonnel would have the lowest possible risk for 
occupational exposure to infectious agents. 
Evaluation of individual situations also needs to 
include consideration of the provisions of other 
applicable federal, state, and local laws. 
Part II. Recommendations for 
prevention of infections in health care 
personnel 
The Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Public Health Service 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this document, the term health care personnel 
refers to all paid and unpaid persons working in 
health care settings who have the potential for 
exposure to infectious materials including body 
substances, contaminated medical supplies and 
equipment, contaminated environmental sur­
faces, or contaminated air. These personnel may 
include but are not limited to physicians, nurses, 
technicians, therapists, pharmacists, nursing 
assistants, laboratory personnel, autopsy person­
nel, emergency medical service personnel, dental 
personnel, students and trainees, contractual staff 
not employed by the health care facility, and per­
sons not directly involved in patient care but 
potentially exposed to infectious agents (e.g., vol­
unteer, dietary, housekeeping, maintenance, and 
clerical personnel). 
As in previous CDC guidelines, each recommen­
dation is categorized on the basis of existing sci­
entific data, theoretic rationale, applicability, and 
potential economic impact. The system for cate­
gorizing recommendations is as follows: 
Category IA 
Strongly recommended for all hospitals and 
strongly supported by well-designed experimental 
or epidemiologic studies. 
Category IB 
Strongly recommended for all hospitals and 
reviewed as effective by experts in the field and 
a consensus of Hospital Infection Control 
Practices Advisory Committee members on the 
basis of strong rationale and suggestive evi­
dence, even though definitive scientific studies 
have not been done. 
Category II 
Suggested for implementation in many hospi­
tals. Recommendations may be supported by sug­
gestive clinical or epidemiologic studies, a strong 
theoretic rationale, or definitive studies applica­
ble to some but not all hospitals. 
No recommendation; unresolved issue 
Practices for which insufficient evidence or 
consensus regarding efficacy exists. 
B. ELEMENTS OF A PERSONNEL HEALTH 
SERVICE FOR INFECTION CONTROL 
1. Coordinated planning and administration 
a. Coordinate policy making and planning for 
the personnel health service among the hospi­
tal administration, personnel health service, 
infection control personnel clinical services, 
pharmacy personnel, various other hospital 
departments, and relevant external agencies. 
Include paid and nonpaid personnel (e.g., vol­
unteers, trainees, physicians, out-of-hospital 
and contractual personnel, and emergency 
responders) in the plan. Category IB 
b. Establish an active system and develop a writ­
ten policy for notifying infection control per­
sonnel of (1) infections in personnel (includ­
ing volunteers, trainees, contractual person­
nel, and out-of-hospital personnel) that 
require work restrictions or exclusion from 
work, (2) clearance for work after an infec­
tious illness that required work restrictions or 
exclusion, (3) work-related infections and 
exposures, and when appropriate (4) results 
of epidemiologic investigations. Category IB 
c. Develop protocols to ensure coordination 
between the personnel health program, the 
infection control program, and other rele­
vant departments of the facility. Category IB 
2. Placement evaluation 
a. Before personnel begin duty or are given a 
new work assignment, conduct health inven­
tories. The inventories should include the fol­
lowing: (1) immunization status or history of 
vaccine-preventable diseases (e.g., chicken­
pox, measles, mumps, rubella, hepatitis B) 
and (2) history of any conditions that may 
predispose personnel toward acquiring or 
transmitting infectious diseases. Category IB 
b. Perform directed physical and laboratory 
examinations on personnel, as indicated by 
the results of the health inventory. Include 
examinations to detect conditions that might 
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increase the likelihood of transmitting disease 
to patients or cause unusual susceptibility to 
infection, and examinations to serve as a 
baseline for determining whether any future 
problems are work related. Category IB 
c. Conduct personnel health assessments other 
than placement evaluations on an as-needed 
basis, for example, as required to evaluate 
work-related illness or exposures to infec­
tious diseases. Category IB 
d. Do not perform routine cultures on person­
nel (e.g., cultures of the nose, throat, or 
stool) as part of the placement evalua­
tion.170 Category IB 
e. Conduct routine screening for TB by using the 
intradermal (Mantoux), intermediate-strength 
(5 tuberculin units) PPD test on personnel who 
have potential for exposure to TB. Category II 
f.	 Conduct routine serologic screening for 
some vaccine-preventable diseases, such as 
hepatitis B, measles, mumps, rubella, or 
varicella, if deemed to be cost-effective to the 
hospital and beneficial to the health care 
personnel. Category II 
3. Personnel health and safety education 
a. Provide personnel, annually and whenever the 
need arises, with in-service training and edu­
cation on infection control appropriate and 
specific for their work assignments, so that 
personnel can maintain accurate and up-to­
date knowledge about the essential elements 
of infection control. Ensure that the following 
topics are included in the initial training on 
infection control: (1) handwashing; (2) modes 
of transmission of infection and importance of 
complying with standard and transmission-
based precautions; (3) importance of report­
ing certain illnesses or conditions (whether 
work related or acquired outside the hospital), 
such as generalized rash or skin lesions that 
are vesicular, pustular, or weeping, jaundice, 
illnesses that do not resolve within a designat­
ed period (e.g., a cough that persists for >2 
weeks, gastrointestinal illness, or febrile illness 
with fever of >103° F lasting >2 days), and hos­
pitalizations resulting from febrile or other 
contagious diseases; (4) tuberculosis control; 
(5) importance of complying with standard 
precautions and reporting exposure to blood 
and body fluids to prevent transmission of 
bloodborne pathogens; (6) importance of 
cooperating with infection control personnel 
during outbreak investigations; and (7) impor-
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tance of personnel screening and immuniza­
tion programs. Category IB 
b. Ensure that all personnel know whether they 
have medical conditions or receive medical 
treatment that renders them more suscepti­
ble to or more likely to transmit infections, 
so that they can follow recommendations to 
greatly reduce their risk of transmitting or 
acquiring infections (e.g., request for work 
reassignment). Category IB 
c. Make specific written policies and procedures 
for control of infections in health care personnel 
readily available to all personnel. Category IB 
d. Provide educational information appropri­
ate, in content and vocabulary, to the educa­
tional level, literacy, and language of the 
employee. Category IB 
4. Job-related illnesses and exposures 
a. Maintain a record on health care personnel 
that includes information obtained during the 
medical evaluation, immunization records, 
results of tests obtained in any screening or 
control programs, and reports of work-related 
illnesses or exposures in accordance with state 
and federal regulatory requirements. 
b. Establish a readily available mechanism for 
personnel to obtain advice about illnesses 
they may acquire from or transmit to 
patients. Category IB 
c. Develop written protocols for handling job-
related and community-acquired infectious 
diseases or important exposures. Record the 
occurrences of job-related infectious dis­
eases or important exposures in the person’s 
record and when applicable notify appropri­
ate infection control personnel and members 
of the personnel health service. Category IB 
5. Record keeping, data management, and 
confidentiality 
a. Establish and keep an updated record for all 
personnel and maintain the confidentiality 
of their records while ensuring that they 
receive appropriate management for occupa­
tional illnesses or exposures. Ensure that 
individual records for volunteers, trainees, 
contractual personnel, and personnel who 
provide care outside of hospitals are similar­
ly kept and maintained. Category IB 
b. Ensure that when data on personnel health 
are made public, the individual’s confiden­
tiality is maintained, for example, by releas­
ing only aggregate numbers. Category IB 
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c.	 Maintain a personnel database, preferably 
computerized, that allows tracking of personnel 
immunizations, screening tests, and assess­
ment of trends of infections and diseases in per­
sonnel. Copies of their individual records are to 
be available to personnel. Category IB 
d. Periodically review and assess aggregate 
data gathered on personnel health (e.g., rates 
of PPD-test conversion) to determine the 
need for action. Category IB 
e. Ensure that all federal, state, local, and com­
munity standards on medical record keeping 
and confidentiality are met.26,27 Category IB 
C. PROTECTION OF PERSONNEL AND OTHER 
PATIENTS FROM PATIENTS WITH INFECTIONS 
Apply precautions described in the current 
“Guideline for Isolation Precautions in Hos­
pitals”3 and other guidelines.382 Category IB 
D. IMMUNIZATION OF HEALTH CARE PER­
SONNEL, GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Formulate a written comprehensive policy 
on immunizing health care personnel. 
Category IB 
2. Ensure that persons administering immu­
nizing agents are (a) familiar with ACIP rec­
ommendations,8,9 (b) well informed about 
indications, storage, dosage, preparation, 
side effects, and contraindications for each 
of the vaccines, toxoids, and immune globu­
lins used,8,9,24 and (c) kept updated on nation­
al and local recommendations regarding vac­
cination of health care personnel (Tables 1 
and 2). Category IB 
3. Ensure that immunization product informa­
tion is available at all times and that a perti­
nent health history, especially a history of 
allergy and potential vaccine contraindica­
tions, is obtained from each person before 
an agent is given (Table 2). Category IB 
4. Develop a list of needed immunizations for 
each employee during screening and an indi­
vidual plan to provide the necessary vac­
cines. Category IB 
5. In the absence of a known occupational 
exposure, provide personnel with on-site 
immunizations or refer personnel to their 
own health care providers for routine 
non–occupation-related immunizations 
against diphtheria, pneumococcal disease, 
hepatitis A, or tetanus (Table 1). Category IB 
6. Provide vaccine to personnel who may have 
occupational exposure to uncommon dis-
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eases such as plague, typhus, or yellow fever, 
or refer them to their own health care 
providers. Category IB 
E. PROPHYLAXIS AND FOLLOW-UP AFTER 
EXPOSURE, GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Ensure that when personnel are offered neces­
sary prophylactic treatment with drugs, vac­
cines, or immune globulins, they are informed 
of (a) options for prophylaxis, (b) the risk (if 
known) of infection when treatment is not 
accepted, (c) the degree of protection provided 
by the therapy, and (d) the potential side 
effects of the therapy. Category IB 
2. Ensure that when personnel are exposed to 
particular infectious agents, they are in­
formed of (a) the recommended postexpo­
sure management that is based on current 
knowledge about the epidemiology of the 
infection, (b) the risk (if known) of transmit­
ting the infection to patients, other person­
nel, or other contacts, and (c) the methods of 
preventing transmission of the infection to 
other persons. Category IB 
F. PERSONNEL RESTRICTION BECAUSE OF 
INFECTIOUS ILLNESSES OR SPECIAL CONDI­
TIONS, GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Develop well-defined policies concerning 
contact of personnel with patients when 
personnel have potentially transmissible 
conditions. These policies should govern 
(a) personnel responsibility in using the 
health service and reporting illness, (b) 
work restrictions, and (c) clearance for 
work after an illness that required work 
restriction. Category IB 
2. Identify the persons with authority to relieve 
personnel of duties. Category IB 
3. Develop work-exclusion policies that encour­
age personnel to report their illnesses or 
exposures and that do not penalize them 
with loss of wages, benefits, or job status. 
Category IB 
4. Educate and encourage personnel who have 
signs and symptoms of a transmissible infec­
tious disease to report their condition 
promptly to their supervisor and occupation­
al health. Category IB 
5. Provide appropriate education for personnel 
on the importance of good hygienic prac­
tices, especially handwashing and covering 
the nose and mouth when coughing and 
sneezing. Category IB 
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G. PREVENTION OF NOSOCOMIAL TRANS­
MISSION OF SELECTED INFECTIONS 
1. Bloodborne pathogens, general recommen­
dation 
Ensure that health care personnel are famil­
iar with precautions to prevent occupational 
transmission of bloodborne pathogens.3,6,30,31,39 
Category IA 
Follow state and federal guidelines and 
strategies for determining the need for work 
restrictions for health care personnel infected 
with bloodborne pathogens.48 Category IB 
a. Hepatitis B 
1) Administer hepatitis B vaccine to person­
nel who perform tasks involving routine 
and inadvertent (e.g., as with housekeep­
ers) contact with blood, other body fluids 
(including blood-contaminated fluids), 
and sharp medical instruments or other 
sharp objects.9,10,40 Category IA 
2) Before vaccinating personnel, do not rou­
tinely perform serologic screening for 
hepatitis B, unless the health care organi­
zation considers screening cost-effective 
or the potential vaccinee requests it.9 
Category IA 
3) Conduct postvaccination screening for 
immunity to hepatitis B within 1 to 2 
months after the administration of the 
third vaccine dose to personnel who per­
form tasks involving contact with blood, 
other body fluids (including blood-conta­
minated fluids), and sharp medical instru­
ments or other sharp objects. Category IA 
4) Revaccinate persons not found to have an 
antibody response after the initial hepati­
tis B vaccine series with a second three-
dose vaccine series. If persons still do not 
respond after revaccination, refer them 
for evaluation for lack of response, (e.g., 
possible chronic HBV infection; Tables 1 
and 4).9 Category IB 
5) Semiannually test for HBsAg and anti-
HBs staff in chronic dialysis centers who 
do not respond to the hepatitis B vac­
cine.55 Category IA 
6) Use both passive immunization with 
hepatitis B immune globulin and active 
immunization with hepatitis B vaccine for 
postexposure prophylaxis in susceptible 
personnel who have had a needlestick, 
percutaneous, or mucous membrane 
exposure to blood known or suspected to 
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be at high risk for being HBsAg seroposi­
tive (Table 6). Category IA 
7) Follow current recommendations for post-
exposure prophylaxis after percutaneous 
or mucous membrane exposure to blood 
and body fluids that is known or suspected 
to be at high risk for being HBsAg seropos­
itive (Table 4).40 Category IA 
b. Hepatitis C 
1) Do not administer immune globulin to 
personnel who have exposure to blood or 
body fluids positive for antibody to 
HCV.37 Category IB 
2) Consider implementing policies for post-
exposure follow-up at baseline and 6 
months for health care personnel who 
have had a percutaneous or mucosal 
exposure to blood containing antibody to 
HCV.37 Category IB 
c. Human immunodeficiency virus 
Follow current recommendations for postex­
posure prophylaxis after percutaneous or 
mucocutaneous exposure to blood or body 
fluids containing blood from a source sus­
pected or known to be HIV-infected.33,80 
Category IB 
2. Conjunctivitis 
Restrict personnel with epidemic keratocon­
junctivitis or purulent conjunctivitis caused 
by other microorganisms from patient care 
and the patient’s environment for the dura­
tion of symptoms. If symptoms persist 
longer than 5 to 7 days, refer personnel to an 
ophthalmologist for evaluation of continued 
infectiousness. Category IB 
3. Cytomegalovirus 
a. Do not restrict personnel from work who con­
tract CMV-related illnesses.119 Category IB 
b. Ensure that pregnant personnel are aware of 
the risks associated with CMV infection and 
infection control procedures to prevent 
transmission when working with high-risk 
patient groups (Table 6).3,117 Category IA 
c. Do not routinely use workplace reassign­
ment as a method to reduce CMV exposures 
among seronegative pregnant person­
nel.88,92,95-97,102,105,106,119,120 Category IA 
4. Diphtheria 
a. Encourage vaccination with Td every 10 
years for health care personnel (Table 1).9,19 
Category IB 
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b. Obtain 	nasopharyngeal cultures from 
exposed personnel and monitor for signs and 
symptoms of diphtheria for 7 days after 
exposure.149 Category IB 
c. Administer antimicrobial prophylaxis to per­
sonnel who have contact with respiratory 
droplets or cutaneous lesions of patients infect­
ed with diphtheria. Also administer a dose of 
Td to previously immunized exposed person­
nel who have not been vaccinated within the 
previous 5 years (Table 1).19,149 Category IB 
d. Repeat nasopharyngeal cultures of personnel 
found to have positive cultures at least 2 weeks 
after completion of antimicrobial therapy. 
Repeat antimicrobial therapy if personnel 
remain culture positive.149 Category IB 
e. Exclude exposed personnel and those identi­
fied as asymptomatic carriers from duty 
until antimicrobial therapy is completed and 
results of two nasopharyngeal cultures 
obtained at least 24 hours apart are negative 
(Table 3).149 Category IB 
5. Gastroenteritis 
a. Vaccinate microbiology laboratory person­
nel who work with S. typhi on a regular 
basis, according to published guide­
lines.151,162 Category II 
b. Pending their evaluation, exclude personnel 
with acute gastrointestinal illnesses (vomit­
ing or diarrhea, with or without other symp­
toms such as nausea, fever, or abdominal 
pain) from contact with patients and their 
environment or from food handling (Table 
3).3,171 Category IB 
c. Consult local and state health authorities 
regarding work restrictions for patient care 
personnel or food handlers with enteric 
infections. Category IB 
d. Determine the etiology of gastrointestinal ill­
ness among personnel who care for patients 
at high risk for severe disease. Category IB 
e. Allow 	personnel infected with enteric 
pathogens to return to work after their 
symptoms resolve, unless local regulations 
require exclusion from duty. Category II 
f. Ensure that personnel returning to work 
after a gastrointestinal illness practice 
good hygienic practices, especially hand-
washing, to reduce or eliminate the risk of 
transmission of the infecting agents.167 
Category IB 
g. Do not routinely perform follow-up cultures 
or examinations of stool for enteric patho-
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gens other than Salmonella to determine 
when the stool is free of the infecting organ­
ism, unless local regulations require such 
procedures. Category IB 
h. Do not perform routine stool cultures on asymp­
tomatic health care personnel, unless required 
by state and local regulations. Category IB 
6. Hepatitis A virus 
a. Do not routinely administer inactivated 
hepatitis A vaccine to health care person­
nel. Susceptible personnel living in areas 
where hepatitis A is highly endemic 
should be vaccinated to prevent acquisi­
tion of community-acquired infection.9,204 
Category IB 
b. Do not routinely administer immune globu­
lin as prophylaxis for personnel providing 
care or who are exposed to a patient with 
hepatitis A.204 Category IB 
c. Administer immune globulin (0.02 ml/kg) to 
personnel who have had oral exposure to 
fecal excretions from a person acutely infect­
ed with HAV (Table 1).204 Category IA 
d. In documented outbreaks involving trans­
mission of HAV from patient to patient or 
from patient to health care worker, use of 
immune globulin may be indicated in per­
sons with close contact with infected per­
sons. Contact the local health department 
regarding control measures (Table 1). 
Category IB 
e. Exclude personnel who have acute hepatitis 
A from duty until 1 week after the onset of 
jaundice (Table 3). Category IA 
7. Herpes simplex virus 
a. Evaluate personnel with primary or 
recurrent orofacial herpes simplex infec­
tions on a case-by-case basis to assess the 
potential for transmission to high-risk 
patients (e.g., neonates, intensive care 
unit patients, patients with severe burns 
or eczema, and severely immunocompro­
mised patients) and the need for exclu­
sion from the care of such patients (Table 
3).209,218 Category IB 
b. Counsel personnel with orofacial herpes 
simplex to cover and not touch the infected 
lesions, to observe handwashing policies, 
and not to allow the lesions to touch patients 
with dermatitis.215 Category IB 
c. Exclude personnel with herpes simplex 
infections of the fingers or hands (herpetic 
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whitlow) from contact with patients until 
their lesions are healed.213,214 Category IB 
8. Measles 
a. Ensure that all personnel have documented 
immunity to measles. 
1) Administer measles vaccine* to persons 
born in 1957 or later, unless they have evi­
dence of measles immunity.9 Category IA 
2) Administer measles vaccine* to person­
nel born before 1957 if they do not have 
evidence of measles immunity and are at 
risk for occupational exposure to 
measles (Table 1).8,221,233,234 Category IA 
3) Do not routinely perform serologic screening 
for measles before administering measles 
vaccine* to personnel, unless the health care 
employer considers screening cost-effective 
or the potential vaccinee requests it.8,11,235-238 
Category IA 
4) Administer postexposure measles vaccine* 
to measles-susceptible personnel who have 
contact with persons with measles within 72 
hours after the exposure (Tables 1 through 
3).8 Category IA 
b. Exclude exposed personnel who do not have 
documented immunity to measles from duty 
from the fifth day after the first exposure 
until the 21st day after the last exposure to 
measles, regardless of whether they receive 
3).11,237postexposure vaccine (Table 
Category IB 
c. Exclude personnel who acquire measles 
from duty for 7 days after rash develops or 
for the duration of their acute illness, 
whichever is longer (Table 3).9 Category IB 
9. Meningococcal disease 
a. Do not routinely administer meningococcal vac­
cine to health care personnel.15 Category IB 
b. Consider vaccination of laboratory person­
nel who are routinely exposed to N. menin­
gitidis in solutions that may be aerosolized 
(Table 1).15 Category IB 
c. Immediately offer antimicrobial prophylaxis 
to personnel who have had intensive close 
contact (e.g., mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, 
endotracheal intubation, endotracheal tube 
management) with a patient with meningo­
coccal disease before administration of 
*MMR is the vaccine of choice. If the recipient is known to be 
immune to one or more of the components, monovalent 
or bivalent vaccines may be used. 
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antibiotics without the use of proper precau­
tions (Table 1).15 Category IB 
d. Do not routinely give quadrivalent A,C,Y,W­
135 meningococcal vaccines for postexpo­
sure prophylaxis (Table 1).15 Category II 
e. Administer meningococcal vaccine to per­
sonnel (and other persons likely to have con­
tact with infected persons) to control 
serogroup C outbreaks after consultation 
with public health authorities.15 Category IB 
f. Consider preexposure vaccination of labora­
tory personnel who routinely handle soluble 
preparations of N. meningitidis.15 Category II 
g. Exclude personnel with N. meningitidis 
infections from duty until 24 hours after the 
start of effective therapy. Do not routinely 
exclude personnel from duty who only have 
nasopharyngeal carriage of N. meningitidis. 
Category IA 
10. Mumps 
a. Administer mumps vaccine* to all personnel 
without documented evidence of mumps 
immunity, unless otherwise contraindicated 
(Table 1).9,258 Category IA 
b. Before vaccinating personnel with mumps 
vaccine,* do not routinely perform serologic 
screening for mumps, unless the health care 
employer considers screening cost-effective 
or it is requested by the potential vaccinee.12 
Category IB 
c. Exclude susceptible personnel who are 
exposed to mumps from duty from the 12th 
day after the first exposure through the 26th 
day after the last exposure or, if symptoms 
develop, until 9 days after the onset of 
parotitis (Table 3).9,255 Category IB 
11. Parvovirus 
a. Ensure that pregnant personnel are aware of 
the risks associated with parvovirus infection 
and of infection control procedures to prevent 
transmission when working with high-risk 
patient groups (Table 6).274,275 Category IB 
b. Do not routinely exclude pregnant personnel 
from caring for patients with B19. Category IB 
12. Pertussis 
a. Do not administer whole-cell pertussis vac­
cine to personnel (Table 1).9 Category IB 
b. NO 	RECOMMENDATION for routine 
administration of an acellular pertussis vac­
cine to health care personnel. UNRE­
SOLVED ISSUE 
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c. Immediately offer antimicrobial prophylaxis 
against pertussis to personnel who have had 
unprotected (i.e., without the use of proper 
precautions), intensive (i.e., close, face-to­
face) contact with a patient who has a clini­
cal syndrome highly suggestive of pertussis 
and whose cultures are pending; discontinue 
prophylaxis if results of cultures or other 
tests are negative for pertussis and the clini­
cal course is suggestive of an alternate diag­
nosis (Table 1).287,288 Category II 
d. Exclude personnel in whom symptoms devel­
op (e.g., cough ≥ 7 days, particularly if accom­
panied by paroxysms of coughing, inspirato­
ry whoop, or posttussive vomiting) after 
known exposure to pertussis from patient 
care areas until 5 days after the start of 
appropriate therapy (Table 3).9 Category IB 
13. Poliomyelitis 
a. Determine whether the following personnel 
have completed a primary vaccination series: 
(1) persons who may have contact with 
patients or the secretions of patients who 
may be excreting wild polioviruses and (2) 
laboratory personnel who handle specimens 
that might contain wild polioviruses or who 
do cultures to amplify virus (Table 1).21 
Category IA 
b. For above personnel, including pregnant 
personnel or personnel with an immunodefi­
ciency, who have no proof of having com­
pleted a primary series of polio immuniza­
tion, administer the enhanced inactivated 
poliovirus vaccine rather than oral 
poliovirus vaccine for completion of the 
series (Table 1).21 Category IB 
c. When a case of wild-type poliomyelitis infec­
tion is detected or an outbreak of poliomyelitis 
occurs, contact the CDC through the state 
health department. Category IB 
14. Rabies 
a. Provide preexposure vaccination to person­
nel who work with rabies virus or infected 
animals in rabies diagnostic or research 
activities (Table 1).5,22 Category IA 
b. After consultation with public health 
authorities, give a full course of antirabies 
treatment to personnel who either have 
*MMR is the vaccine of choice. If the recipient is known to be 
immune to one or more of the components, monovalent 
or bivalent vaccines may be used. 
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been bitten by a human being with rabies 
or have scratches, abrasions, open 
wounds, or mucous membranes contami­
nated with saliva or other potentially 
infective material from a human being 
with rabies. In previously vaccinated indi­
viduals, postexposure therapy is abbreviat­
ed to include only a single dose of vaccine 
on day 0 and one on day 3 (Table 1).295-297 
Category IB 
15. Rubella 
a. Vaccinate all personnel without documented 
immunity to rubella with rubella vaccine* 
(Table 1).9,309 Category IA 
b. Consult local and state health departments 
regarding regulations for rubella immunity 
in health care personnel. Category IA 
c. Do not perform serologic screening for rubel­
la before vaccinating personnel with rubella 
vaccine,* unless the health care employer 
considers it cost-effective or the potential 
vaccinee requests it.237 Category IB 
d. Do not administer rubella vaccine* to sus­
ceptible personnel who are pregnant or 
might become pregnant within 3 months of 
vaccination (Table 1).9 Category IA 
e. Administer rubella vaccine* in the postpar­
tum period to female personnel not known 
to be immune. Category IA 
f.	 Exclude susceptible personnel who are 
exposed to rubella from duty from the sev­
enth day after the first exposure through the 
21st day after the last exposure (Table 3).9 
Category IB 
g. Exclude personnel who acquire rubella from 
duty until 7 days after the beginning of the 
rash (Table 3).9 Category IB 
16. Scabies and pediculosis 
a. Evaluate exposed personnel for signs and 
symptoms of mite infestation and provide 
appropriate therapy for confirmed or sus­
pected scabies.311 Category IA 
b. Evaluate exposed personnel for louse infes­
tation and provide appropriate therapy for 
confirmed pediculosis.330 Category IA 
c. Do not routinely provide prophylactic scabi­
cide treatment to personnel who have had 
skin-to-skin contact with patients or other 
persons with scabies (Table 1).310,311,316,326 
Category II 
d. Consider providing prophylactic scabicide 
treatment to personnel who have skin-to­
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skin contact with patients or other persons 
with scabies in situations where transmis­
sion has occurred.311,331 Category II 
e. Do not routinely provide prophylactic 
pediculicide treatment to personnel who 
have had contact with patients or other 
persons with pediculosis, unless they have 
evidence of infestation. Category II 
f. Exclude personnel with confirmed scabies 
from the care of patients until they have 
received appropriate treatment and have 
been shown, by medical evaluation, to have 
been effectively treated.311 Category II 
g. Exclude personnel with confirmed or sus­
pected louse infestation from contact with 
patients until after they receive appropri­
ate initial treatment and are found to be 
free of adult and immature lice (Table 
3).335 Category IB 
17. Staphylococcal infection or carriage 
a. Obtain appropriate cultures and exclude per­
sonnel from patient care or food handling if 
they have a draining lesion suspected to be 
caused by S. aureus, until the infections have 
been ruled out or personnel have received 
adequate therapy and their infections have 
resolved (Table 3).340 Category IB 
b. Do not routinely exclude personnel with sus­
pected or confirmed carriage of S. aureus 
(on nose, hand, or other body site) from 
patient care or food handling unless it is 
shown epidemiologically that they are 
responsible for disseminating the organism 
in the health care setting (Table 3).340,342,343,350 
Category IB 
18. Group A Streptococcus infections 
a. Obtain appropriate cultures and exclude 
personnel from patient care or food han­
dling if they have draining lesions that are 
suspected to be caused by Streptococcus. 
Work restrictions should be maintained 
until streptococcal infection has been 
ruled out or personnel have received ade­
quate therapy for 24 hours (Table 3).369­
371,374 Category IB 
b. Do not routinely exclude personnel with sus­
pected or confirmed carriage of group A 
Streptococcus from patient care or food han­
dling unless it is shown epidemiologically 
that they are responsible for disseminating 
the organism in the health care setting 
(Table 3).369,373,378 Category IB 
19. Tuberculosis 
a. General recommendations 
1) Educate all health care personnel regard­
ing the recognition, transmission, and 
prevention of TB. Category IB 
2) Follow current recommendations out­
lined in the “Guidelines for Preventing the 
Transmission of Mycobacterium tubercu­
losis in Health-Care Facilities, 1994.”382 
Category IB 
b. TB screening program 
1) Include all health care personnel who 
have potential for exposure to M. tubercu­
losis in a PPD skin-test program.382 
Category IA 
2) Administer PPD tests by using the intra­
cutaneous (Mantoux) method of adminis­
tration of 5 tuberculin units (0.1 ml) 
PPD.382,406-408 Category IB 
3) Do not routinely test personnel known to 
have conditions that cause severe suppres­
sion of cell-mediated immunity (such as 
HIV-infected persons with lowered CD4+ 
counts and organ-transplant recipients 
receiving immunosuppressive therapy) 
for cutaneous anergy at the time of PPD 
testing.408 Category IB 
4) Ensure that the administration, reading, 
and interpretation of PPD tests are per­
formed by specified, trained personnel.382 
Category IA 
c. Baseline PPD 
1) Perform baseline PPD tests on health care 
personnel who are new to a facility and 
who have potential for exposure to M. 
tuberculosis, including those with a histo­
ry of BCG vaccination.382 Category IB 
2) Perform two-step, baseline PPD tests on 
newly employed health care personnel who 
have negative results of initial PPD testing 
and have not had a documented negative 
PPD-test result during the preceding 12 
months, unless the institution has deter­
mined that two-step testing is not warrant­
ed in its facility.382 Category II 
3) Interpret baseline PPD-test results as out­
lined in the “Guidelines for Preventing the 
Transmission of Mycobacterium tubercu­
losis in Health-Care Facilities, 1994.”382 
Category IB 
d. Follow-up (repeat) PPD 
1) Perform periodic follow-up PPD tests on 
all health care personnel with negative 
baseline PPD-test results who have the 
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potential for exposure to M. tuberculo­
sis.382 Category IA 
2) Base the frequency of repeat PPD testing 
on the hospital’s risk assessment, as 
described in the “Guidelines for Preventing 
the Transmission of Mycobacterium tuber­
culosis in Health-Care Facilities, 1994” and 
as provided by federal, state, and local reg­
ulations.382 Category IB 
3) Exempt from follow-up PPD tests person­
nel with documented history of positive 
baseline PPD-test result or adequate treat­
ment for TB.382 Category IB 
4) Consider retesting immunocompromised 
health care personnel who have potential 
for exposure to M. tuberculosis at least 
every 6 months.382 Category II 
5) Interpret follow-up-PPD test results as 
outlined in the “Guidelines for Preventing 
the Transmission of Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis in Health-Care Facilities, 
1994.”382 Category IB 
6) Management of PPD-positive personnel 
a) Promptly evaluate personnel with posi­
tive PPD-test results for active disease 
and obtain an adequate history on TB 
exposure to help determine whether the 
infection is occupational or community 
acquired.382 Category IB 
b) Perform chest radiographic examinations 
on personnel with a positive PPD-test 
result as part of the evaluation for active 
TB. If results of the initial chest radi­
ographic examination are negative, do not 
repeat chest radiograph unless symptoms 
suggestive of TB develop.382 Category IB 
c) Periodically remind all personnel, espe­
cially those with positive PPD-test 
results, about the symptoms of TB and 
the need for prompt evaluation of any 
pulmonary symptoms suggestive of 
TB.382 Category IB 
d) Do not require routine chest radi­
ographs for asymptomatic, PPD-nega­
tive workers.382 Category IB 
e. Preventive therapy 
1) Offer preventive therapy to the following 
personnel, regardless of age, who have 
conversion of their PPD test: (a) recent 
converters, (b) close contacts of persons 
with active TB, (c) those with medical con­
ditions that increase their risk for active 
TB, (d) those with HIV infection, and (e) 
injecting-drug users.382,407 Category IB 
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2) Offer preventive therapy to all other per­
sonnel (i.e., who do not have the above risk 
factors) with positive PPD reactions if they 
are younger than 35 years.407 Category IA 
3) Provide preventive therapy to personnel 
through the occupational health program 
or refer them to the health department or 
their health care provider, as appropriate. 
Category IB 
f. Postexposure management of personnel 
1) As soon as possible after an exposure to TB 
(i.e., exposure to a person with pulmonary 
or laryngeal TB for whom proper isolation 
precautions were not implemented), con­
duct PPD testing on personnel who are 
known to have negative PPD-test results. If 
the initial postexposure PPD-test result is 
negative, repeat the PPD test 12 weeks 
after the exposure.382 Category IB 
2) Do not perform PPD tests or chest radi­
ographs on personnel with previous posi­
tive PPD-test results, unless they have 
symptoms suggestive of active TB.382 
Category IB 
g. Workplace restrictions 
1) Exclude personnel with infectious pul­
monary or laryngeal TB from the workplace 
until the facility has documentation from 
their health care provider that they are 
receiving adequate therapy, their coughs 
have resolved, and that they have had three 
consecutive sputum smears collected on dif­
ferent days with negative results for AFB. 
After personnel return to work, obtain peri­
odic documentation from their health care 
provider that effective drug therapy has 
been maintained for the recommended peri­
od and that sputum smear results remain 
negative for AFB (Table 3).382 Category IB 
2) Promptly evaluate for infectiousness those 
personnel with active TB who discontinue 
treatment before they are cured. Exclude 
from duty those who are found to remain 
infectious until (a) treatment is resumed, 
(b) an adequate response to therapy is doc­
umented, and (c) sputum smear results are 
negative for AFB.382 Category IB 
3) Consider directly observed therapy for 
personnel with active TB who have not 
been compliant with drug regimens. 
Category IB 
4) Do not exclude personnel from the work­
place who have TB only at sites other than 
the lung or larynx.382 Category IB 
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5) Do not restrict personnel from their usual 
work activities if they are receiving pre­
ventive therapy because of positive PPD-
test results, even if they are unable or 
unwilling to accept or complete a full 
course of preventive therapy. Instruct them 
to seek prompt evaluation if symptoms 
suggestive of TB develop.382 Category IB 
h. Immunocompromised personnel 
1) Refer personnel who are known to be 
immunocompromised to personnel health 
professionals who can individually coun­
sel them regarding their risk for TB.382 
Category II 
2) At the request of immunocompromised 
personnel, offer but do not compel rea­
sonable accommodations for work set­
tings in which they would have the lowest 
possible risk for occupational exposure to 
M. tuberculosis. Consider the provisions 
of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 
1990 and other federal, state, and local 
regulations in evaluating these situa­
tions.382 Category II 
i. Bacille Calmette-Guérin vaccination 
1) In settings associated with high risk for M. 
tuberculosis transmission: 
a) Consider BCG vaccination of personnel 
on an individual basis, and only in set­
tings where (1) a high proportion of iso­
lates of M. tuberculosis are resistant to 
isoniazid and rifampin, (2) there is a 
strong likelihood of transmission and 
infection with such drug-resistant organ­
isms, and (3) comprehensive infection 
control precautions have been imple­
mented and have failed to halt nosoco­
mial transmission of TB.412 Consult with 
the local and state health departments in 
making this determination. Category II 
b) Do not require BCG vaccination for 
employment or for assignment of per­
sonnel in specific work areas.412 
Category II 
2) Counsel health care personnel who are 
being considered for receipt of BCG vacci­
nation about the risks and benefits of both 
BCG vaccination and preventive therapy, 
including (a) the variable data on the effi­
cacy of BCG vaccination, (b) the potential­
ly serious complications of BCG vaccine in 
immunocompromised individuals, such as 
those with HIV infection, (c) the lack of 
information on chemoprophylaxis for 
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MDR-TB infections, (d) the risks of drug 
toxicity with multidrug prophylactic regi­
mens, and (e) the fact that BCG vaccina­
tion interferes with the diagnosis of newly 
acquired TB infection.412 Category IB 
3) Do not administer BCG vaccine to person­
nel in settings associated with a low risk for 
M. tuberculosis transmission. Category IB 
4) Do not administer BCG vaccine to pregnant 
or immunocompromised persons with neg­
ative baseline PPD-test results. Category II 
20. Vaccinia 
a. Ensure that personnel who directly handle 
cultures of or animals contaminated or 
infected with vaccinia, recombinant vaccinia 
viruses, or other orthopox viruses (e.g., mon­
keypox, cowpox) that infect human beings 
receive smallpox vaccination every 10 years 
(Table 1).9,18 Category IB 
b. Consider administering vaccinia vaccine to 
personnel who provide clinical care to recip­
ients of recombinant vaccinia virus vaccines 
(Table 1).9,18 Category II 
c. Do not administer vaccinia vaccine to pregnant 
personnel or personnel with immunosuppres­
sion or eczema (Tables 1 and 2). Category IB 
d. Do not exclude from duty personnel who 
receive the vaccine, if they keep the vaccina­
tion site covered and adhere to handwashing 
practices.18 Category IB 
21. Varicella 
a. Administer varicella vaccine to susceptible 
personnel, especially those that will have 
contact with patients at high risk for serious 
complications (Table 1).9,13 Category IA 
b. Do not perform serologic screening of per­
sons with negative or uncertain history of 
varicella before administering varicella vac­
cine to personnel, unless the institution con­
siders it cost-effective.9,13 Category IB 
c. Do not routinely perform postvaccination 
testing of personnel for antibodies to vari­
cella.9 Category IB 
d. NO RECOMMENDATION for administering 
postexposure varicella vaccination for the 
protection of exposed, susceptible person­
nel.9 UNRESOLVED ISSUE 
e. Develop guidelines for managing health care 
personnel who receive varicella vaccine; for 
example, consider precautions for personnel 
who acquire a rash after receipt of varicella vac­
cine and for other health care personnel who 
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receive varicella vaccine and will have contact 
with susceptible persons at high risk for serious 
complications from varicella.9 Category IB 
f. Develop written guidelines for postexposure 
management of vaccinated or susceptible 
personnel who are exposed to wild-type vari­
cella.9 Category IB 
g. Exclude personnel from work who have 
onset of varicella until all lesions have dried 
and crusted (Table 3).3 Category IB 
h. Exclude from duty after exposure to varicella 
personnel who are not known to be immune 
to varicella (by history or serology), begin­
ning on the tenth day after the first exposure 
until the 21st day after the last exposure (28th 
day if VZIG was given; Table 3).9 Category IB 
i. Restrict immunocompetent personnel with 
localized zoster from the care of high-risk 
patients until lesions are crusted; allow them 
to care for other patients with lesions cov­
ered.9 Category IB 
j. Restrict immunocompromised personnel with 
zoster from contact with patients until their 
lesions are crusted (Table 3).9 Category IB 
k. Restrict susceptible personnel exposed to 
zoster from patient contact from the tenth 
day after the first exposure through the 21st 
day after the last exposure (28th day if VZIG 
was given; Table 3).9 Category IB 
l. Perform serologic screening for immunity to 
varicella on exposed personnel who have not 
had varicella or are unvaccinated against 
varicella.9,13 Category IB 
m. Consider performing serologic screening 
for immunity to varicella on exposed, vacci­
nated personnel whose antibody status is not 
known. If the initial test result is negative, 
retest 5 to 6 days after exposure to determine 
whether an immune response occurred. 
Category IB 
n. Consider excluding vaccinated personnel 
from work beginning on the 10th day after 
the first exposure through the 21st day after 
the last exposure if they do not have 
detectable antibodies to varicella, or screen 
daily for symptoms of varicella (Table 3).9 
Category IB 
o. Do not routinely give VZIG to exposed sus­
ceptible personnel, unless immunosup­
pressed, HIV infected, or pregnant. If VZIG 
is given, exclude personnel from duty from 
the 10th day after the first exposure through 
the 28th day after the last exposure (Tables 1 
and 3).9,13 Category IB 
22. Viral respiratory infections 
a. Administer influenza vaccine annually to all 
personnel, including pregnant women, 
before the influenza season, unless otherwise 
contraindicated (Table 1).9,17 Category IB 
b. Consider the use of antiviral postexposure 
prophylaxis for unvaccinated health care per­
sonnel during institutional or community 
outbreaks of influenza for the duration of 
influenza activity, or consider giving vaccine 
to unvaccinated personnel and providing 
them with antiviral postexposure prophylaxis 
for 2 weeks after vaccination (Table 1).3,17,459 
Category IB 
c. Consider excluding personnel with acute 
febrile respiratory infections or with lab­
oratory evidence of epidemiologically 
significant viruses from the care of high-
risk patients (e.g., neonates, young 
infants, patients with chronic obstructive 
lung disease, and immunocompromised 
patients) during community outbreaks of 
influenza or RSV infections (Table 3).3 
Category IB 
H. SPECIAL ISSUES 
1. Pregnancy 
a. Counsel pregnant women and women of 
childbearing age regarding the risk of 
transmission of particular infectious dis­
eases (e.g., CMV, hepatitis, herpes simplex, 
HIV, parvovirus, rubella) that, if acquired 
during pregnancy, may have adverse effects 
on the fetus, whether the infection is 
acquired in nonoccupational or occupa­
tional environments. Provide such women 
with information on standard and trans-
mission-based precautions appropriate for 
each infection (Table 6).3,489-491 Category IB 
b. Do not routinely exclude women only on 
the basis of their pregnancy or intent to be 
pregnant from the care of patients with 
particular infections that have potential to 
harm the fetus (e.g., CMV, HIV, hepatitis, 
herpes simplex, parvovirus, rubella, and 
varicella; Table 6).489-491 Category IB 
2. Emergency-response employees 
Ensure that emergency-response employees 
are routinely notified of infectious diseases in 
patients they have cared for or transported, in 
accordance with the mandates of the 1990 
Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources 
Emergency Act (Subtitle B 42 USC 300ff-80). 
Category IA 
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3. Personnel linked to outbreaks of bacterial infection 
a. Perform cultures and organism typing only 
on personnel who are linked epidemiologi­
cally to an increase in bacterial infections 
caused by a pathogen associated with a car­
rier state; if culture results are positive, 
exclude personnel from patient contact until 
carriage is eradicated or the risk of disease 
transmission is eliminated. Category IB 
b. Do not perform routine surveillance cul­
tures of health care personnel for bacteria 
or multidrug-resistant organisms in the 
absence of a cluster or epidemic of bacte­
rial infections in which personnel are 
implicated. Category IA 
c. Do not exclude personnel from duty who 
are colonized with bacteria, including 
multidrug-resistant bacteria, who are not 
epidemiologically linked to an increase in 
infections. Category IB 
4. Latex hypersensitivity 
a. Develop an institutional protocol for (1) 
evaluating and managing personnel with 
suspected or known latex allergy, (2) 
establishing surveillance for latex reac­
tions within the facility, (3) purchasing 
gloves, and (4) measuring the impact of 
preventive measures. Educational materi­
als and activities should be provided to 
inform personnel about appropriate glove 
use and the manifestations and potential 
risk of latex allergy.31,546 Category IB 
b. Glove purchasers should review information 
on the barrier effectiveness of gloves and 
consider worker acceptance (e.g., comfort 
and fit) when selecting gloves for use in the 
health care organization.31,547-549 Category IB 
c. To facilitate the appropriate selection of 
gloves, the occupational health service 
should maintain a list of all gloves used 
the institution according to whether they 
do or do not contain latex. Category II 
d. Evaluate personnel with symptoms sugges­
tive of latex allergy (e.g., localized dermati­
tis and workplace-related asthma).522 Use 
serologic tests only for those who, on the 
basis of this evaluation, have suspected 
latex allergy.504,516 Category IB 
e. Avoid the use of all latex products by per­
sonnel with a history of systemic reactions 
to latex.509-512,520,522-524 Category IB 
f. Use nonlatex gloves for personnel with 
localized reactions to latex.502,507,513-515 
Category IB 
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g. Target interventions (e.g., substitution of 
nonlatex gloves and powder-free latex 
gloves) to areas of the facility where per­
sonnel have acquired systemic allergic 
reaction to latex.506,533,534 Category IB 
h. NO RECOMMENDATION for institution-
wide substitution of nonlatex products in 
health care facilities to prevent sensitiza­
tion to latex among health care personnel. 
UNRESOLVED ISSUE 
i. NO RECOMMENDATION for the routine 
use of environmental abatement interven­
tions (such as laminar-flow or high-efficien­
cy particulate air filtration) to reduce latex 
aeroallergens.534 UNRESOLVED ISSUE 
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